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INTRODUCTION
At a time of U.S. budget cuts, popularly known as the “sequester,”2
court systems across the nation are facing financial shortfalls.3  Small
claims courts are no exception.4  Among the worst hit states is California,
which is suffering staffing cutbacks that result in long delays5 prompting
consideration of the old maxim, “justice delayed is justice denied.”6  Simi-
lar problems, albeit on a larger scale, are evident in other nations including
India where the Law Commission has argued that the millions of pending
cases combined with the lagging uptake of technological best practices has
impeded judicial productivity, leading to “disappointment and dissatisfac-
tion among . . . justice-seekers.”7 As justice systems continue to struggle
with inadequate resources, and individuals are confronted with the reality
that pursuing claims, especially low-value claims, are often not worth the
effort, justice is being denied to millions of individuals.
One option for improving access to justice is to encourage the wider
use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).  As court-annexed mediation
is gathering steam, some are arguing that increased usage of online dispute
resolution (ODR) is an effective mechanism to further reduce barriers to
accessing justice.8  Yet ODR presents new challenges as technology and
platform design, especially those that have no human interaction, as the
2. The Sequester Explained, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/
default/files/BCA%20Sequester%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (last visited July 31, 2014).
3. See Emily Green, Budget Woes Mean Big Delays For Small Claims Courts, NPR
(May 15, 2013, 3:13AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/05/17/182640434/budget-woes-mean-big-
delays-for-small-claims-courts.
4. Id. For a general description of small claims courts, see Resolve Consumer
Problems in Small Claims Court, USA.GOV, http://www.usa.gov/topics/consumer/complaint/
legal/small-claims-court.shtml (last visited July 31, 2014) (defining small claims courts as
“courts [that] resolve disputes over small amounts of money. While the maximum amount
that can be claimed differs from state to state, court procedures are generally simple, inex-
pensive, quick and informal. Court fees are minimal, and you often get your filing fee back if
you win your case”).
5. See CAL. JUDICIAL BRANCH, In Focus: Judicial Branch Budget Crisis, http://www
.courts.ca.gov/partners/1494.htm (last visited July 31, 2014).
6. LIBRARY OF CONG., RESPECTFULLY QUOTED: A DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS
183 (2010) (citing LAURENCE J. PETER, PETER’S QUOTATIONS 276 (1977) (attributing the
maxim’s origin to William E. Gladstone)).
7. REPORT ON STRATEGIC PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ICT IN INDIAN JUDICIARY
1 (2005), available at http://indianjudiciary.nic.in/images/main.pdf [hereinafter STRATEGIC
PLAN].
8. Ruha Devanesan & Jeffrey Aresty, ODR and Justice – An Evaluation of Online
Dispute Resolution’s Interplay with Traditional Theories of Justice, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESO-
LUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION 251, 293 (Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab, Ethan Katsh, & Daniel Rainey eds., 2012).
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system may unduly preference efficiency at the expense of justice.  This
balancing act between efficiency and due process is not only playing out in
the United States, but in countries and regions around the world.  Indeed,
the United States, European Union, and India all share a common interest
in and, at some level, hesitation to use ODR.9 This hesitation is likely to
grow as the use of algorithms with the ODR platform increases, necessitat-
ing the answering of questions prior to the widespread use of this
technology.
This Article addresses the automation of ODR through the lens of the
access to justice literature.  In Part I, we describe the evolution and pre-
sent state of ODR and discuss its applicability to improving “access to
justice.”  Part II surveys a subset of governments  including the United
States, Mexico, and the E.U., which were chosen because they represent a
spectrum of potential ODR platforms ranging from purely public to pri-
vate systems.  A particular focus of this Part is India, since this is a nation
that has widely adopted ADR and is considering ODR but is still grap-
pling with access to justice issues.  Part III surveys the current public and
private entities offering, or about to offer, ODR.  Part IV concludes the
Article by discussing lessons learned regarding whether, and under what
conditions, ODR improves access to justice, and if new forms of “polycen-
tric”10 regulation might be needed to help ensure this outcome.  Ulti-
mately, we argue that an effective and ethical ODR platform requires the
use of algorithms to settle the more common disputes, but that minimalis-
tic regulation must be introduced to ensure due process protections exist
within the system.
I. ODR AS AN ACCESS TO JUSTICE ISSUE
The importance of individuals’ need to have access to justice is central
to human rights protections. The U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon,
for example, has stated that:
The rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all
persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the
9. While the hesitation is subtle and at times more the product of negotiations and
other pre-drafting meetings, some commentators are beginning to express reservations about
the widespread use of ODR. See e.g., Dispute Resolution in India – An Update, LAWQUEST,
http://lawquestinternational.com/dispute-resolution-india-%E2%80%93-update (last visited
July 31, 2014); Joseph W. Goodman, The Pros and Cons of Online Dispute Resolution, DUKE
L. & TECH. REV., Feb. 18, 2003, at 7–9, http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1073&context=dltr; David Niven, EU Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Propos-
als Criticised Following UK Consultation, LEXOLOGY (May 3, 2012), http://www.lexology
.com/library/detail.aspx?g=582722f7-0f94-4814-8c6b-947e11bc2e30; TECHNO LEGAL CENTRE
OF EXCELLENCE FOR ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ODR) IN INDIA (TLCEODRI), On-
line Dispute Resolution in India, http://www.odrindia.in/tlceodri/?p=14 (last updated Oct. 25,
2012).
10. Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 32-33
(World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 5095, 2009) (discussing the definition of
the term “polycentric”).
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State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated,
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are
consistent with international human rights norms and standards.11
For purposes of this Article, the systemic definition of the rule of law
embodied in the above quotation is narrowed to allow discussion of the
rule of law as it relates to civil matters and ADR.  The World Justice Pro-
ject (WJP), an independent, non-profit organization, “develops communi-
ties of opportunity and equity by advancing the rule of law worldwide.”12
One of the major initiatives of the WJP is the Rule of Law Index (2012-
13), which is a quantitative assessment tool that offers a detailed and
“comprehensive picture of the extent to which countries adhere to the rule
of law in practice[,]”13 and is relied on here to provide a framework for
discussion.14
The WJP asserts that access to civil justice “requires that the system
be accessible, affordable, effective, impartial, and culturally competent.”15
The civil justice index measures seven key factors: (1) that “[p]eople can
access and afford civil” justice; (2) “[c]ivil justice is free of discrimination;
(3) civil justice is free of corruption; (4) [c]ivil justice is free of improper
government influence; (5) [c]ivil justice is not subject to unreasonable de-
lays; (6) [c]ivil justice is effectively enforced”; and (7) ADRs are accessi-
ble, impartial, and effective.16  Our focus here is on the indicators that
measure accessibility and cost, the absence of unreasonable delays, and
ADR because these factors demonstrate a global need to consider a
greater use of ODR.
11. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and
Post-Conflict Societies: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23,
2004), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/395/29/PDF/N04395
29.pdf?OpenElement.
12. See WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, http://worldjusticeproject.org/ (last visited July 31,
2014).
13. Juan C. Botero & Alejandro Ponce, Measuring the Rule of Law 1 (World Justice
Project Working Paper Series, Paper No. 001, Nov. 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1966257.
14. See MARK DAVID AGRAST ET AL., THE WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, WORLD JUS-
TICE PROJECT RULE OF LAW INDEX 117 (2011), available at http://worldjusticeproject.org/
sites/default/files/WJP_Rule_of_Law_Index_2011_Report.pdf.
15. Id. According to Professor Mauro Cappelletti, there are three main obstacles that
make civil and political liberties inaccessible in many parts of the world. First, due to eco-
nomic reasons, individuals are unable to access information or adequate representation. Sec-
ond, due to organizational obstacles, the isolated individual lacks sufficient motivation,
power, and information to initiate and pursue litigation. Third, sometimes procedural
processes are inadequate, that is, “traditional contentious litigation in court might not be the
best possible way to provide effective vindication rights[ ]” for many individuals. Mauro Cap-
pelletti, Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes with the Framework of the Worldwide Ac-
cess to Justice Movement, 56 MOD. L. REV. 282, 283–84 (1993).
16. See Civil Justice, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, http://worldjusticeproject.org/factors/
effective-civil-justice (last visited July 31, 2014).
Spring 2014] Technology, Ethics, and Access to Justice 489
T
A
B
L
E
 1
: 
W
JP
’S
T
H
E
 R
U
L
E
O
F
 L
A
W
 I
N
D
E
X
1
7
7.
7
A
D
R
s
7.
4
7.
5
ar
e
7.
1
F
re
e 
of
N
ot
 s
ub
je
ct
ac
ce
ss
ib
le
,
P
eo
pl
e 
ca
n
7.
2
7.
3
im
pr
op
er
to
7.
6
im
pa
rt
ia
l,
O
V
E
R
A
L
L
ac
ce
ss
 a
nd
F
re
e 
of
F
re
e 
of
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
un
re
as
on
ab
le
E
ff
ec
ti
ve
ly
an
d
SC
O
R
E
af
fo
rd
di
sc
ri
m
in
at
io
n
co
rr
up
ti
on
in
fl
ue
nc
e
de
la
ys
en
fo
rc
ed
ef
fe
ct
iv
e
A
U
S
T
R
A
L
IA
0.
72
0.
60
0.
56
0.
92
0.
86
0.
51
0.
77
0.
85
C
H
IN
A
0.
43
0.
58
0.
45
0.
37
0.
10
0.
64
0.
35
0.
52
G
E
R
M
A
N
Y
0.
80
0.
71
0.
87
0.
85
0.
83
0.
68
0.
87
0.
78
IN
D
IA
0.
45
0.
46
0.
50
0.
47
0.
68
0.
20
0.
26
0.
55
IT
A
L
Y
0.
56
0.
62
0.
50
0.
73
0.
70
0.
29
0.
33
0.
74
JA
P
A
N
0.
77
0.
64
0.
83
0.
85
0.
79
0.
65
0.
79
0.
83
M
E
X
IC
O
0.
40
0.
48
0.
29
0.
37
0.
54
0.
30
0.
28
0.
54
N
O
R
W
A
Y
0.
82
0.
73
0.
81
0.
93
0.
89
0.
69
0.
74
0.
92
R
U
S
S
IA
0.
50
0.
54
0.
56
0.
43
0.
42
0.
52
0.
40
0.
60
SO
U
T
H
 A
F
R
IC
A
0.
55
0.
49
0.
47
0.
64
0.
62
0.
41
0.
52
0.
67
U
N
IT
E
D
 K
IN
G
D
O
M
0.
72
0.
66
0.
73
0.
84
0.
78
0.
58
0.
64
0.
82
U
N
IT
E
D
 S
T
A
T
E
S
0.
65
0.
53
0.
53
0.
86
0.
75
0.
44
0.
63
0.
83
17
.
Se
e 
T
he
 R
ul
e 
of
 L
aw
 I
nd
ex
, 
W
O
R
L
D
 J
U
S
T
IC
E
 P
R
O
JE
C
T
, 
ht
tp
://
w
or
ld
ju
st
ic
ep
ro
je
ct
.o
rg
/r
ul
e-
of
-l
aw
-i
nd
ex
 (
fo
llo
w
 “
D
ow
nl
oa
d 
th
e 
D
at
as
et
” 
hy
pe
rl
in
k)
 (
la
st
vi
si
te
d 
Ju
ly
 3
1,
 2
01
4)
.
490 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 35:485
By way of summary, these data points highlight the extent to which
the United States serves as an example of a nation in crisis.  As can be
seen from Table 1, the United States ranked twenty-first out of sixty-six
nations along the dimension of “access to civil justice” in 2011.18  “Acces-
sibility includes general awareness of available remedies, availability and
affordability of legal advice and representation, and absence of excessive
or unreasonable fees and . . . hurdles . . . .”19  As a result of the absence of
general awareness and especially the cost, the United States ranked re-
markably low within its region: twelfth of sixteen.20  In fact, within the
group of nations having similar incomes, survey respondents ranked the
United States an embarrassing twentieth out of twenty—three.21  These
numbers are echoed in numerous jurisdictions around the world, for ex-
ample, nearly thirty million cases are pending in Indian courts,22 some of
which have been within the justice system for more than twenty years.23
This places India well within the lower third of the WJP Access to Civil
Justice Global Rankings: seventy-eighth of ninety—seven.24
The results are unsurprising as the Indian legal system has long been
mired by backlog in its outstanding caseload, resulting from among other
factors overly elaborate, unenforced procedures, automatic appeals, and
systemic vacancies from the bench, and critically misaligned incentive
structures, among other factors.25  The Law Commission of India has
maintained that the reason for judicial delay is not a lack of clear procedu-
ral laws, but rather the imperfect execution, or even utter non-observance,
thereof.26  Given the huge number of pending cases, the governance and
administrative control over judicial institutions through manual processes
has become extremely difficult, resulting in systematic failure.  The gov-
ernment’s Report on Strategic Plan for Implementation of ICT in Indian
18. See AGRAST, supra note 14, at 111.
19. WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 12.
20. AGRAST, supra note 14 at 150.
21. Id.
22. See Neeta Lal, Huge Case Backlog Clogs India’s Courts, ASIA TIMES ONLINE (Jun.
28, 2008), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JF28Df02.html; Amol Sharma &
Vibhuti Agarwal, India Rape Case Tests Fast-Track Courts, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2013, 8:26
PM), http://.wsj.com// SB10001424127887323854904578261551780617048.html.
23. See Hiram E. Chodosh et al., Indian Civil Justice System Reform: Limitation and
Preservation of the Adversarial Process, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 7 (1997-98) (discuss-
ing  judicial reform efforts in India in general, not specifically, with ADR).
24. See Civil Justice, supra note 16.
25. See Hiram E. Chodosh, Emergence from the Dilemmas of Justice Reform, 38 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 587, 601 (2003) (“In India . . . backlog and delay derive from a lack of accountabil-
ity, discipline, versatility, and finality.”). A description of available reform options is
presented in Appendix 1.
26. The ILC has stated, “The delay results not from the procedure laid down by it but
by reason of the non-observance of many of its important provisions particularly those in-
tended to expedite the disposal of proceedings.” Law Commission of India, 77th Report,
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/51-100/Report77.pdf.
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Judiciary argues that this has negatively affects judicial productivity.27
The Supreme Court of India made it clear that this state of affairs must be
addressed: “An independent and efficient judicial system is one of the ba-
sic structures of our constitution. . . . [I]t is our constitutional obligation to
ensure that the backlog of cases is decreased and efforts are made to in-
crease the disposal of cases.”28
In many instances, one solution to mitigate backlog and increase effi-
ciency is to create and support an efficient and fair ODR platform.  This
may be illustrated in the European Union context.  Tonio Borg, as Euro-
pean Commissioner for Health and Consumer Policy noted: “The [E.U.]
ADR and ODR legislation will strengthen their possibilities to solve their
disputes out-of-court in a simple, fast and low-cost way.”29  He was also
quick to point out: “This improvement will not only prevent overburden-
ing court proceedings with low value affairs, but it is expected to motivate
consumers to seek redress in the first place.”30 The Commissioners com-
ments are reflective of the anticipated increase in the access to justice that
will occur with the creation of an effective ADR and ODR European wide
system.31
Not only is access to justice likely to be increased, economic impacts
are anticipated to occur as well.  As noted by Dr. Ann Neville Director of
European Consumer Centre, Ireland:
According to recent research, losses experienced by cross-border
shoppers are estimated at EUR425 million per annum. The Euro-
pean Commission has estimated that if EU consumers can rely on
well-functioning and transparent ADR for their disputes, both na-
tional and cross-border, they could save around _22.5 billion a
year, corresponding to 0.19% of EU GDP.32
And these anticipated impacts are not merely a dream of legislative
ODR enthusiasts-private ODR systems currently exist that demonstrate
real world impact when an online dispute resolution platform is effectively
implemented.  For example, on a global level, eBay and PayPal Resolution
Centers33 “resolve more than 60 million disputes per year in more than a
27. See STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 7.
28. Brij Mohan Lal v. Union of India & Others, (2002) 5 S.C.C. 1 (India), available at
http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1017222/.
29. Tonio Borg, European Comm’r for Health & Consumer Policy, Address at the
European Consumer Centres Cooperation Day (May 23, 2013) [hereinafter Borg Address],
available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/borg/docs/speech_23052013__.pdf.
30. Id.
31. See Julia Ho¨rnle, Encouraging Online Dispute Resolution in the EU and Beyond -
Keeping Costs Low or Standards High? 25–27 (Queen Mary Sch. of Law Legal Studies Re-
search Paper No. 122/2012, 2012), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2154214.
32. EU Consumers Could Save _22.5 Billion A Year From New Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms, EU2013 (May 23, 2013, 7:18 PM), http://www.eu2013.ie/news/news-items/201305
23ecc-netconference/ [hereinafter EU2013].
33. Discussed in detail, infra Part III.A.
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dozen different languages around the world.”34  As Collin Rule notes: “It
is the largest ODR system in the world, resolving disputes in areas as di-
verse as item payment, item receipt, and item condition.”35 Within the
platform eBay users can resolve disputes using the Resolution Center pro-
cess, with immediate effect and enforcement.36  In fact, “more than ninety
percent of the disputes filed are resolved without requiring the interven-
tion of a third party to render a decision.”37  These systems are clear indi-
cation that a well-designed ODR platform can increase individuals’ access
to justice, but questions remain regarding to what extent efficiency is
trumping access to justice, which is a balancing act also playing out in
India.
II. A SYSTEM IN NEED: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN INDIA
The role of law, as argued by Gandhi, is to “unite parties driven asun-
der.”38  Law, then, has a preeminent role to play in the resolution of dis-
putes, which in turn “is an essential characteristic for societal peace, amity,
comity and harmony.”39  The need for fast and equitable dispute resolu-
tion is what has lead nations around the world to adopt various manifesta-
tions of ADR, including India.40  Indeed, “ADR has become a global
necessity” as judicial backlog proliferates.41  In fact, the goal of ADR is
enshrined in the Indian Constitution’s preamble itself, which enjoins the
state “to secure to all the citizens of India, justice—social, economic, and
political—liberty, equality, and fraternity.”42  The Constitution goes on to
elaborate these goals by adding, “[t]he State shall secure that the opera-
tion of the legal system promotes justice . . . ; to ensure that opportunities
for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or
34. Collin Rule, eBay Resolution Center Up for Dutch Innovating Justice Awards -
Needs Your Vote!, MEDIATE.COM (June 2011), http://www.mediate.com/articles/vote.cfm.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. MAHATMA GANDHI, THE STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS WITH TRUTH 168 (1962).
39. Jitendra N. Bhatt, A Round Table Justice Through Lok-Adalat (Peoples’ Court) –
A Vibrant-ADR-In India, 1 SCC (JOUR) 11, 11 (2002), available at http://kelsa.nic.in/lok
adalat.htm.
40. Nevertheless, fierce arguments for and against consensual dispute resolution have
been sparked. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE. L. J. 1073, 1076 (1984)
(arguing against settlement because of the adverse effects of resource disparity); Andrew W.
McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE. L. J. 1660 (1985) (responding
to Fiss); Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L. J. 1669 (1985) (responding to McThenia &
Schaffer); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485 (1985); Judith Resnik, Many
Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 211 (1995).
41. ASIA DEV. BANK, THE ROLE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN BUILDING A HAR-
MONIOUS SOCIETY 591 (2006); see also Bhatt, supra note 39.
42. INDIA CONST., pmbl.
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other disabilities.”43  The Supreme Court of India has interpreted this
principle to equate “social justice” with ‘legal justice,’ which means that
the system of administration of justice must “provide a cheap, expeditious
and effective instrument for realization of justice by all Sections of the
people, irrespective of their social or economic position or their financial
resources.”44
Unfortunately, the current manifestation of the Indian judiciary is
neither expeditious nor inexpensive.  Unlike other nations’ courts,45 In-
dian courts are not deaf to such pleas. The Supreme Court of India
deemed endemic delay unconstitutional, stating: a “speedy trial is of [the]
essence to criminal justice and there can be no doubt that the delay in trial
by itself constitutes denial of justice.”46  In response, both the Indian Par-
liament and judiciary, spearheaded by the Supreme Court, instituted mas-
sive ADR projects throughout India.47  One of the primary mechanisms
through which the Indian Parliament and courts have sought to deal with
this problem is through the creation of Lok Adalats (peoples’ courts),48
43. Id., art. 39(A); see also CENTRE ON PUB. LAW & JURISPRUDENCE AT JINDAL
GLOBAL LAW SCH., JUSTICE WITHOUT DELAY: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGAL AND INSTI-
TUTIONAL REFORM 3 (2012) [hereinafter JUSTICE WITHOUT DELAY], available at http://
www.scribd.com/doc/37565811/Justice-Without-Delay-1.
44. Babu vs. Raghunathji, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 1734 (India); see also Madabhushi Sridhar,
Miscarriage of Fast Track Justice, LEGAL SERVICES OF INDIA, available at http://www.legalser
vicesindia.com/articles/misoj.htm (last visited July 31, 2014).
45. This argument bears a remarkable similarity to the travails of a Chancery Court
described by Charles Dickens in Bleak House 150 years ago:
This is the Court of Chancery . . . which gives to monied might, the means abun-
dantly of wearing out the right; which exhausts finances, patience, courage, hope;
so overthrows the brain and breaks the heart; that there is not an honorable man
among its practitioners who would not give – who does not often give – the warn-
ing ‘suffer any wrong that can be done rather than come here!’
CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 4 (1853).
46. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1364 (India); JUSTICE
WITHOUT DELAY, supra note 43, at 7. In yet another case the Court affirmed this principle by
adding that “[t]here can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial and by speedy trial we mean
a reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of fundamental right to life
and liberty enshrined in Article 21.” Khatoon, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1364.
47. See JUSTICE WITHOUT DELAY, supra note 43, at 16; Tassaduq Hussain Jillani,
Delayed Justice & the Role of A.D.R., SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 5, http://
www.supremecourt.gov.pk/ijc/Articles/7/1.pdf (last visited July 31, 2014).
48. India’s ADR effort falls under its consensual dispute resolution (CDR) program.
CDR encompasses a variety of techniques (e.g., mediation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
early neutral evaluation, conciliation, and settlement by Lok Adalat) designed to create a
greater variety of options in the resolution of disputes. CDR allows litigants the opportunity
to settle disputes in a consensual manner, through more conciliatory, less formal, and more
flexible processes than in litigation. See HIRAM CHODOSH, GLOBAL JUSTICE REFORM: A
COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY 42 (2005). Of the various manifestations of CDR, arbitration
and settlement through Lok Adalat are the ones currently most widely available. Lok
Adalats are a blend of all three forms of traditional ADR: arbitration, mediation, and concili-
ation. See Anurag K. Agarwal, Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Development of
Society: ‘Lok Adalat’ in India (Indian Inst. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2005-11-01, Novem-
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which are designed to promote the rapid conciliation and binding resolu-
tion of disputes.49 As will be described in further detail later, these local
courts are effectively local ADR mechanisms, and as such serve as an ex-
cellent point for starting a larger access to justice and ADR discussion.
The implementation of local courts has produced staggeringly positive
improvements. “[M]ore than 200,000 Lok Adalats have been held”
throughout India leading to the settlement of millions of cases.50  So far,
more than $1 billion has been distributed to compensate accident victims,
and at least 6.7 million people have received legal aid.51  These efforts
have been successful in decreasing backlog in key areas of need.52  The
efficiency of the system is staggering in light of the timeframes for tradi-
tional court proceedings in India that frequently take years or even de-
cades.53  Efficiency is not the only benefit of the introductions of Lok
Adalats; however, as these bodies also promote the rapid and equitable
resolution of disputes in a manner that is culturally attuned to traditional
Indian jurisprudence.
Lok Adalats are not without their critics, including advocates, judges,
and certain classes of consumers, each with competing vested interests at
play.  Now, with the creation of dedicated Permanent Lok Adalats, which
are specialized to certain classes of cases, power asymmetries have become
more prevalent.54  This begs the question of whether justice is being com-
promised in the name of judicial efficiency, in a manner paralleling the
debate over ODR.
ber, 2005), available at http://www.iimahd.ernet.in/publications/data/2005-11-01anurag.pdf.
They use conciliation, with elements of arbitration given that decisions are typically binding,
and are an illustration of legal decentralization as conflicts are returned to communities from
whence they originated for local settlement. See Robert Moog, Conflict and Compromise:
The Politics of Lok Adalats in Varanasi District, 25 L. & SOC. REV. 545, 545-58 (1991).
49. See Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, “Bread for the Poor”: Access to Justice
and the Rights of the Needy in India, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 789, 789 (2004). See generally Marc
Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, Debased Informalism: Lok Adalats And Legal Rights In Mod-
ern India, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF
LAW 96 (Erik Jensen & Tom Heller eds., 2003).
50. Agarwal, supra note 48. See Lok Adalat for Speedy Justice, HINDU (Dec. 18, 2001),
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/op/2001/12/18/stories/2001121800060100.htm; Jillani, supra
note 47, at 5 (“Lok Adalats have so far settled over ninety-seven lakh legal matters through-
out the country.”).
51. Manzoor Elahi, Lok Adalat System in India, ACADEMIA.EDU 2, http://www.academ
ia.edu/3296008/Lok_Adalat_System_in_India (last visited July 31, 2014).
52. See H.R. Bhardwaj, Legal and Judicial Reforms in India, INT’L CENTER FOR AL-
TERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, http://icadr.ap.nic.in/articles/articles.html (last visited July
31, 2014); Elahi, supra note 51, at 4.
53. See Janet Martinez et al., Dispute System Design: A Comparative Study of India,
Israel, and California, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 807, 808-10 (2013).
54. See Elahi, supra note 51, at 7–8.
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A. In the Name of Efficiency: Analyzing ADR Efforts in India
India, the most populous and diverse democracy in the world, has a
legal system to match.55  The system, a composition of ancient Hindi
panchayats (village assemblies), Islamic law, and a formal British judiciary,
has long been under immense strain, stifling economic competiveness and
the pursuit of justice alike.  As Lord Delvin famously said, “If our business
methods were as antiquated as our legal methods we should be a bankrupt
country.”56  As was illustrated in Table 1, backlog and delay stemming
from myriad factors including misaligned incentive structure among the
key players exist in a wide array of legal systems around the world.  Ar-
guably, these problems are most accentuated in modern-day India.  Thus,
India has become a test bed for rule of law reform generally, and ADR
specifically.  This case study examines India’s efforts with regard to ADR
critiquing the role and evolution of Lok Adalats, before turning to an
analysis of stakeholders and the potential of ODR to improve access to
justice in the subcontinent.
The “Lok Adalat originated from the failure of the . . . [Indian] le-
gal . . . system to provide effective, fast, and” affordable justice.57  The first
modern Lok Adalat was held in Junagadh in 1981, though some argue that
they originated in the northwestern Indian state of Gujarat by Manharlal
P. Thakkar, the late Chief Justice of the Gujarat High Court.58  Others
contend that they began in the central-western Indian state of Maharash-
tra well before 1982.59  What is not in doubt is Justice Thakkar’s significant
influence in directing the contemporary evolution of Lok Adalats.  The
guiding principle of Justice Thakkar, when he was considering creating a
system of Lok Adalats, was to form a system that was “less expensive, less
speculative, less glamorized, more participatory, and more resolution ori-
ented that would work to serve the purpose of justice with humanity in
mind.”60
The 1987 Legal Services Authorities Act provided free and competent
legal service to disadvantaged groups “to ensure that opportunities for se-
curing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other
disabilities, and to organise Lok Adalats to secure that the operation of
55. See India Profile, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12557384 (last
updated Dec. 13, 2013); Constitution, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, http://supremecourtofindia
.nic.in/constitution.htm (last visited July 31, 2014).
56. Deepka Kr. Azad, Plea Bargaining: A Unique Remedy To Reduce Backlog In In-
dian Court, CAMPUS LAW CENTRE LEGAL AWARENESS (Mar. 15, 2009, 2:01 AM), http://clc
legalawareness.blogspot.com/2009/03/plea-bargaining.html.
57. See Girish Patel, Crippling Lok Adalats, INDIA TOGETHER (Dec. 1, 2007), http://
www.indiatogether.org/2007/dec/hrt-adalat.htm.
58. See id.
59. See P.N. BHAGWATI ET AL., REPORT ON NATIONAL JUDICARE: EQUAL JUSTICE,
SOCIAL JUSTICE (1977) (the “Bhagwati Report”).
60. Patel, supra note 57.
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the legal system promotes justice on the basis of equal opportunity.”61
This statute also gave gives statutory authority to Lok Adalats, based on
the practice of panchayats.62  Under this system, Lok Adalats are available
at both the pre-litigation and litigation stages of dispute resolution thanks
to amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure circa 1908.63
In traditional Lok Adalats, at least one party gives consent for the
matter to be heard by conciliators.  The conciliators are comprised of “[a]
sitting or retired judicial officer and other persons of repute as may be
prescribed by the state government in consultation with the chief justice of
the High Court.”64  If no compromise is “arrived at through conciliation,
the matter shall be returned to the concerned court for disposal . . . .”65
Professor Robert Moog has argued that this system gave the Indian peo-
ple, for the first time in centuries, a choice of forum for the resolution of
their disputes so they may make better-informed, rational decisions.66
Initially, there was great enthusiasm for Lok Adalats, at least among
consumers.  For example, in one early Lok Adalat “in north Gujarat, when
the judges . . . asked an ordinary litigant, ‘What is your problem?’  The
man, with fears [sic] in his eyes, said, ‘For the first time in five years, some-
body has asked me about my case.’”67  But the benefits of Lok Adalats
are not limited to reducing the time to bring a claim.  In fact, the imposi-
tion of Lok Adalats has many of the hallmarks of the WJP markers that
are cited to increase access to justice, such as: filing without a fee, direct
consultation with a neutral without procedural hurdles, an abbreviated
hearing schedule, and the final decision that is binding upon the parties
and enforceable in the local courts as a civil court decree.68
Moreover, within the Lok Adalat system, individuals “have greater
scope for participation in the satisfactory resolution of their disputes.”69
The wider scope of participation arises from Lok Adalats’ ability to per-
61. Legal Services Authorities Act, No. 39 of 1987, pmbl.,INDIA CODE (1994), availa-
ble at http://nalsa.gov.in/actrules.html; see also Martinez et al., supra note 53, at 808-09 (ex-
ploring the evolution of Lok Adalats).
62. For deeper historical assessments of the Lok Adalats, see generally UPENDRA
BAXI, THE CRISIS OF THE INDIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 338-42 (1982); Upendra Baxi, From Takrar
to Karar: The Lok Adalat at Rangpur - A Preliminary Study, 10 J. CONST. & PARLIAMEN-
TARY STUD. 52, 93–95 (1976).
63. See The Code of Civil Procedure, No. 5 of 1908, Sec. 89, CODE CIV. PROC. (India).
The Code of Civil Procedure is itself a derivation of the British Judicature Acts. See gener-
ally, Hillary Heilbron, Courts Caught in a Time Warp, THE TIMES (London), July 6, 1993, at
35 (noting that 1873 was “the time of the last reforms in civil procedure . . . [t]he technologi-
cal revolution has largely bypassed civil litigation,” and that “costs have escalated, delays
have increased, trials have become more complex and they take longer”).
64. Agarwal, supra note 48. See Elahi, supra note 51, at 4–5, 8.
65. Agarwal, supra note 48; Elahi, supra note 51 at 5.
66. See Moog, supra note 48, at 547, 552.
67. Agarwal, supra note 48; Patel, supra note 57.
68. See Martinez et al., supra note 53, at 809.
69. Agarwal, supra note 48.
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form different functions,70 meaning that they may “act simultaneously as
conciliators, mediators, arbitrators or adjudicators as the” situation de-
mands.71  As such, Lok Adalats enjoy myriad different roles—preventing
conflicts from festering, negotiating, bargaining, compromising, and
resolving disputes efficiently.  When considered as a means to improve ac-
cess to justice, it is important to note that the use of Lok Adalats removes
one of the most common drawbacks in traditional litigation, i.e., the po-
tential to lose everything.  Within India, the use of ADR often allows a
compromise position to be reached, thereby reducing the likelihood of a
decimating final judgment.  The inclusion of the ability to compromise
within the system is often heralded as one of the greatest benefits of the
ADR system within India.72  Thus, proponents argue that the pace and
dispensation of justice is back in the hands of the people.
Newspapers across India, including The Hindu, have applauded the
widespread adoption of Lok Adalats as a way to expedite justice.73  The
headlines are full of the resounding success of Lok Adalats in equitably
settling hundreds or thousands of cases, sometimes in a single afternoon.74
Taking a few examples, bankers in Coimbatore were keen to settle hun-
dreds of pending debt actions “amicably.”75  Eighteen banks settled 200
cases in a few hours.76  Many headlines are even more straightforward,
such as “846 Cases Settled.”77  These exhortations underscore the public
need and pride in resolving the greatest number of disputes as quickly as
possible.
These headline quotes raise an interesting implicit question: what pro-
tections are being given up in the name of efficiency?  As case backlogs
began to slowly decline, and individuals began to become comfortable
with the system, the costs in sacrificing procedural protections seemed mi-
70. See Patel, supra note 57.
71. Agarwal, supra note 48.
72. See Chodosh, supra note 23, at 3 n. 4. This has led courts to become competitive
arenas for social status. See Moog, supra note 48, at 551-52 (“Attorneys, judges, and litigants
often cited deference of izzat (honor), harassment, and speculation as reasons for filing with
the courts[,]” confusing the role of courts of law with traditional village panchayats).
73. See, e.g., Nod to 20 Fast Track Courts, 4 Lok Adalats, TRIBUNE INDIA (Mar. 13,
2005), http://www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050314/delhi.htm#1.
74. See, e.g., Lok Adalat, HINDU (Mar. 18, 2004), http://www.hindu.com/2004/03/18/
stories/2004031803250300.htm; 59 Cases of Land Acquisition Settled at Mega Lok Adalat in
Adilabad, HINDU (Mar. 17, 2006), http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-and-
hrapradesh/59-cases-of-land-acquisition-settled-at-mega-lok-adalat-in-adilabad/article31343
62.ece.
75. Lok Adalat for Debts Recovery, HINDU BUS. LINE (Mar. 8, 2005), http://www.the
hindubusinessline.com/todays-paper/tp-money-banking/debt-tribunals-lok-adalat-in-coimba
tore/article2170881.ece.
76. See id.
77. 846 Cases Settled, CHANDIGARH TRIB. (Nov. 9, 2003), http://www.tribuneindia
.com/2003/20031110/cth1.htm. See also, Lok Adalat Settles 390 Bank Cases in TN, HINDU
BUS. LINE (Jun. 23, 2003), http://www.thehindubusinessline.in/2003/06/24/stories/20030624009
41700.htm.
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nor in comparison to the absence of justice.  After all, chronic judicial
stagnation calls for simplifying procedures and increasing flexibility.78
However, during the adoption of Lok Adalats, little attention was made to
undelaying issues that demanded attention. Instead, the judicial system
now seems to place efficiency as the goal, rather than as a means to
achieve justice.
B. Lessons to be Learned from India’s Implementation of ADR
The promise of Lok Adalats was to overcome both the traditional lim-
itations of panchayats as well as the failings of the formal Indian judicial
system with a people-centric approach to jurisprudence with roots in an-
cient India.79  The goal was to reposition humanity in the system, to put
person over procedure in a way that echoes the evolution of the U.S. no-
tice pleading system and its evolution from British civil procedure.80  As
Girish Patel, a senior advocate at the Gujarat High Court stated, “Lawyers
and judges cannot be mere black-letter men looking upon law as only an
exercise in logic and not in life.”81  Unfortunately, this transformation of
the Indian justice system has not yet fully taken hold.  But that does not
mean that the dream is dead.
Although Lok Adalats reduces court backlog, the theory behind Lok
Adalats “was never fully examined and was allowed to grow haphazardly
on an ad hoc basis.  Nobody tried seriously to put it in a larger and proper
historical and socio-political context.”82  Backlog is not the only reason to
create Lok Adalats.  Indeed, Lok Adalats alone will not solve backlog, nor
any of the other myriad problems facing the Indian legal system.  Hard
questions must be asked and answered.  For example, are Lok Adalats
(like ODR) merely a by-product of a failed and overburdened judicial sys-
tem, or an alternative, bottom-up justice-delivery system?  Additionally,
the political context within which the Lok Adalats and courts exists also
exerts pressures and, consequently, guides the directions in which these
bodies can move.83  These pressures should be recognized and accounted
78. Juan Carlos Botero et al., Judicial Reform, 18 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 66,
80-83 (2003); see Moog, supra note 48, at 545 n.1.
79. Lok Adalats may be considered a recent expression of this trend in judicial popu-
lism and the benefits of traditional dispute resolution, which has continued in India since
independence and may trace its roots back to British attempts to establish local panchayats
that would handle petty disputes. See HUGH TINKER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LOCAL SELF
GOVERNMENT IN INDIA, PAKISTAN AND BURMA 117 (1954). Its primary characteristic is “an
overriding concern with the delivery of affordable legal services to the ordinary person.”
Moog, supra note 48, at 552. This underscores the need to make proceedings as affordable as
possible. As such, the 1970s saw a series of government reports culminating in the Bhagwati
Report, a manifesto for judicial populism, urging decentralized, informal, and affordable jus-
tice for the common man. Id. at 552–53.
80. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 95-101 (3d ed.
2005).
81. Patel, supra note 57.
82. Id.
83. See Moog, supra note 48, at 564.
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for in planning the composition and procedures of Lok Adalats, as well as
the expansion of the Lok Adalat system online through ODR, as should
the larger rule of law reforms necessary to improve access to justice in
India.
However, some problems are beyond the pale of legal or judicial re-
form, such as the continued explosive growth of the Indian population and
the resultant strains that this will place on court infrastructure.84  Still,
much can be done to ensure that India enjoys a world-class legal system to
match the goals enshrined in its Constitution.  Even relatively simple re-
forms have the potential to result in vast improvements over the status
quo.  For instance, the internal monitoring and tracking of the key proce-
dural events in the life of a civil case (i.e., more transparent court adminis-
tration) would increase the accountability of courts.85  Greater judicial
involvement in preparing and pacing a civil litigation (“case manage-
ment”) could also impose greater discipline on the civil process, and
thereby reduce the time required to adjudicate a civil claim.86  Other insti-
tutional mechanisms besides ADR could also easily be expanded, such as
the Supreme Court of India’s relaxed locus standi for public interest litiga-
tion.87  At the heart of these reforms though, is the need to make people
aware of their rights. “[T]he people’s right to information has become a
very important instrument for the people in the affairs of the nation.”88
Increased publicity is required to ensure that Indian citizens are educated
on their rights in courts of law, and Lok Adalats alike.
In order to preserve the adversarial model of civil justice, India must
enact greater administrative accountability and judicial control over the
preparation of claims and defenses, and less formal, more conciliatory, and
calibrated consensual resolutions.89  Great strides have been taken in the
name of judicial efficiency.  What is left is to ensure that Lok Adalats live
up to their namesake as true peoples’ courts through targeted reforms,
including ODR discussed in Part III.  When that day comes, ADR will
have the capacity to not only reunite parties riven asunder, but also unify
84. See, e.g., Amrutha Gayathri, India’s Population Will Grow While China’s Will Be-
gin To Decline By 2028, Making India World’s Most Populous Country In About 15 Years,
UN Report Says, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 17, 2013, 12:48AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/indias-
population-will-grow-while-chinas-will-begin-decline-2028-making-india-worlds-most-popu
lous.
85. See Randall T. Shepard, Chief Justice, Indiana Supreme Court, State of the Judici-
ary Address to a Joint Session of the Indiana General Assembly: Burdened but Unbowed
(Jan. 12, 2011), available at http://indianacourts.us/times/2011/02/burdened-but-unbowed/.
86. Chodosh, supra note 23, at 62.
87. See Bharat Desai, Enforcement of the Right to Environment Protection Through
Public Interest Litigation in India, 33 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 27, 28-29 (1993); B.K. SHARMA,
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 117 (2007) (noting that the National Human
Rights Commission of India is another venue for resolving fundamental disputes in a timely
manner, especially through direct petition to the Supreme Court of India under Article 2(6)
or through general public interest litigation provisions).
88. Patel, supra note 57.
89. See id.
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the Indian nation behind a fully functional, equitable, and efficient justice
system.  Over time, this could serve both as a precedent for other coun-
tries to emulate through India acting as a norm entrepreneur,90 and as one
component of creating a system of polycentric governance to enhance ac-
cess to justice as is discussed in Part IV.91
III. ADR MOVES INTO CYBERSPACE
According to noted ADR author Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, “Arbitra-
tion’s fading popularity over the last two decades has energized media-
tion’s growth and has helped it to displace arbitration as the ADR process
of choice.”92  Indeed, Professor Nolan-Haley asserts, “mediation is the
new arbitration.”93  In many ways, the growth of mediation has spurred
renewed attention to ODR, as mediation is a cooperative process fostered
through communication—something that can be facilitated within the on-
line world.  The extension of mediation into cyberspace could drastically
improve individuals’ access to justice.
Before surveying some of the newest approaches to ODR, it is impor-
tant to note that ODR suffers from a lack of definition.  As a result, some
commentators use ODR as a term that means nothing more than the use
of technology in an already existing judicial system.94  Technology as an
annex or facilitator of document receipt, search, and storage is an impor-
tant advance in the judicial system; it is, however, not ODR.  In fact, on-
line communications as a means to allow parties to voice complaints, when
not coupled with a dispute resolution mechanism, should also not be
thought of as ODR.  Mechanisms that allow customers to complain to a
business are nothing more than online customer service facilities; and are
not per se, ODR.  We argue that a true ODR system is one that allows the
parties to do more than merely complain—the platform must involve the
resolution of a dispute and use a neutral facilitator (mediation) or a neu-
tral decision maker (arbitration).
90. See TIM MAURER, CYBER NORM EMERGENCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE ACTIVITIES AT THE UN REGARDING CYBER-SECURITY 47 (2011), available
at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-cyber-norm-dp-2011-11-final.pdf (discuss-
ing the theory of norm entrepreneurs in the cybersecurity context).
91. See Michael D. McGinnis, Costs and Challenges of Polycentric Governance: An
Equilibrium Concept and Examples from U.S. Health Care 1–2 (Vincent & Elinor Ostrom
Workshop in Political Theory & Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, Working
Paper W11-3, 2011), available at http://php.indiana.edu/~mcginnis/Beijing_core.pdf (noting
“[t]he basic idea [of polycentric governance] is that any group . . . facing some collective
problem should be able to address that problem in whatever way they best see fit”).
92. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The ‘New Arbitration’, 17 HARV. NEGOT.
L. REV. 61, 66 (2012) (citing Deborah Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Movement is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165,
183 (2003) (noting that court created “rigid” policies deterred parties from engaging in
arbitration)).
93. Id. at 61.
94. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 9 at 1–16.
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With these parameters in mind, we can narrow the discussion of par-
ticular ODR platforms as few systems truly involve the resolution of a
dispute.  In general, two types of platform providers exist—private and
public—and both deserve consideration.  In terms of private providers, it
is important to note two categorizations at the outset.  Private ODR prov-
iders come in two types: self-contained and full service.  A self-contained
provider resolves disputes within a community, and as such the members
to that community are controlled by, and agree to, the terms of service and
associated agreements that regulate the community and the use of the
platform.  In contrast, a private full service platform provides any and all
parties access to an ODR mechanism.95  The differences between these
various types are fundamental and highly important to the discussion as
private providers are creatures of contract, and are—at least for the time
being—largely unregulated.  The distinctive importance will become evi-
dent in the discussion within this Part, after which it will be possible to
apply lessons learned from our India, United States, and European Union
case studies.
A. Private ODR Platforms
When considering private based platforms, it is important to start by
examining the eBay marketplace members’ platform.96  When eBay
launched in 1995 as “AuctionWeb,” it was rather small and known to rela-
tively few users, so buyers and sellers mostly interacted like friends in a
community.97  The creator, Pierre Omidyar, established a “Feedback Fo-
rum,” telling readers to “[g]ive praise where it is due; make complaints
where appropriate . . . .”98  Since then, eBay has hosted an eBay Resolu-
tion Center that facilitates communication between the buyer and the
seller in the event that something goes wrong with an eBay marketplace
transaction.99  Buyers and sellers can open a case within the eBay market-
place platform, which allows the parties to communicate and attempt to
resolve the issue amongst themselves.100  After three days, should the par-
ties not reach a resolution, a party can escalate the claim to an eBay repre-
95. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 112–123.
96. Of course, others also offer compliant services. For example, Amazon.com allows
customers of third party sellers to file an A-to-z Guarantee claim if you purchased physical
goods or eligible services on the Amazon.com website. See File an A-to-Z Guarantee Claim,
AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_left_sib?ie=UTF8
&nodeId=200783750 (last visited July 31, 2014). A similar service is offered by Etsy. See How
Do I Report a Problem with My Order?, ETSY, http://www.etsy.com/help/article/35 (last vis-
ited July 31, 2013).
97. See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF
A BORDERLESS WORLD 130 (2006).
98. Id. at 131.
99. See How Does eBay Buyer Protection Work?, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/cover
age/BuyerProtectionForBuyers.html (last visited July 31, 2014).
100. See id.
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sentative.101  eBay will then resolve the issue within forty-eight hours.102
In some limited circumstances, eBay Buyer Protection may cover the
purchase price plus original shipping.103
Of course, the customer can also post negative feedback on the seller
and can contact the eBay Trust and Safety team to investigate issues within
the marketplace.  For example, eBay India has used online negotiation
and mediation to resolve reputational disputes.104  Known as the eBay
Community Court, the Court uses trusted eBay community members to
resolve reputation-reporting disputes among the buyers and sellers within
the eBay platform.105 As platform designer and noted ODR authority
Collin Rule highlights “once each side has made their case [uploading ma-
terial, etc.], the matter is put in front of a jury of twenty-one randomly
selected eBay community members.”106  While the jury members do have
to meet stringent eligibility criteria, the jury is made up of uncompensated
volunteers.107  The decisions are reviewed, when needed, for patterns and
problems with outcomes and (in very rare cases) issues with the decisions
of a particular member.108  Although some tinkering was initially
needed,109 the feedback on the Community Court has been very strong
among all of the users.110
Self-contained dispute resolution platforms have advantages over
other private systems in that the marketplace can respond to parties that
fail to comply with dispute outcomes.  For example, within the eBay plat-
form, eBay can take action against parties’ failing to comply by suspending
accounts or allowing the winning party to post negative feedback about
the non-compliant party.111  Moreover, in many of these settings, the pay-
ment mechanism is internal to the marketplace.  In these situations the
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Id. The sellers redress options are different, mainly that the seller may both file a
claim and seek to sell the original item still in its possession. See What to Do When a Buyer
Doesn’t Pay (Unpaid Item Process), EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/questions/no-pay-
ment.html (last visited July 31, 2014).
104. Colin Rule & Harpreet Singh, ODR and Online Reputational Systems – Maintain-
ing Trust and Accuracy Through Effective Redress, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE, A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 8,
at 163, 180-81.
105. Zhao Yun, Timothy Sze, Tommy Li & Chittu Nagarajan, Online Dispute Resolu-
tion in Asia, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, A TREATISE ON
TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 8, at 499, 510.
106. Rule & Singh, supra note 104, at 181.
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. This included changing the words used to describe the online adjudicative process.
Instead of discussing ‘juries’ and ‘courts,’ eBay now uses the term “community review
‘panels’”. Id.
110. See id.
111. Why Was My Account Suspended?, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/account/
questions/account-suspended.html (last visited July 31, 2014).
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payment portion of the marketplace can institute a delay in payment or
can even reverse charges in the event that issues arise relating to the trans-
action.  Systems that allow for delayed payments or that incorporate a sav-
ings account portion of the payment system allow for funds to be returned
to the customer, without the need for merchant compliance with the medi-
ated outcome.112  The use of payment mechanisms, especially one that in-
corporates a chargeback facility, is an important means of compliance and
is often heralded as one of the essential features of a successful private
ODR platform.113  These systems, coupled with the internal “trust
mark,”114 allow for a fully internal system of dispute resolution.
In contrast to the self-contained platforms of dispute resolution, pri-
vate full-service platforms are just beginning to emerge as a possible addi-
tion to a judicial system.  One of the newest players in the full service
private ODR platform marketplace is Modria.115  The creator of the
Modria platform, Collin Rule, was also the creator of the original eBay
and PayPal dispute resolution systems.116 Modria is designed to be a full-
service private provider of dispute resolution services in that it allows par-
ties to bring any dispute to the online platform.117  When someone reports
a problem, the Modria software helps diagnose it by collecting and or-
ganizing information about the issue and suggesting solutions.118  The
software also enables the parties to discuss the matter online.119  If the
parties fail to communicate online, the software guides them to mediation
and arbitration, where the Modria team can assist in resolving the dispute
through the use of either mediation or arbitration.120
Despite its recent entry into the market, the Modria platform has
gained traction by securing several large businesses as clients.121  In fact,
Modria’s CEO stated that his company’s goal is to be “the small-claims
112. See for example, eBay. See supra text accompanying notes 106–111.  In fact, eBay
and other online providers, such as PayPal, use a facility known as a chargeback.  For more
information, see PayPal website, Chargeback guide, at https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/
mpp/security/chargeback-guide
113. See Vikki Rogers, Knitting the Security Blanket For New Market Opportunities, in
ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 8, at 95.
114. A trustmark is, for example, a top rated seller designation based on customer feed-
back. What is E-commerce Trustmark?, WEBOPEDIA, http://www.webopedia.com/Term/E/
e_commerce_trustmark.html (last visited July 31, 2014). See also Pablo Corte´s, Developing
Online Dispute Resolution for Consumers in The EU: A Proposal for the Regulation of Ac-
credited Providers, 19 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 1 (2010)(describing the potential use of
trustmarks in the E.U.).
115. See MODRIA, https://www.modria.com/ (last visited July 31, 2014).
116. See Our Team, MODRIA, https://www.modria.com/team/ (last visited July 31, 2014).
117. See MODRIA, https://www.modria.com/ (last visited July 31, 2014).
118. Fast and Fair Resolutions, MODRIA, http://www.modria.com/resolution-center/
(last visited July 31, 2014).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See MODRIA, http://www.modria.com (last visited July 31, 2014).
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court for the 21st century.”122  The Modria platform replicates a process
well known to all, small claims court, but it does so even in a cross border
situation.123  Consequently, if its claims are accurate, the Modria platform
will become the first to accomplish the development of a private full-ser-
vice dispute resolution platform.  Even more encouraging to the users of
e-commerce, Modria will be the first-public entity to put in place a cross-
border online dispute resolution platform.
B. Public ODR Platforms
Many of the benefits of private self-contained member-based com-
plaint platforms can be replicated in the online public justice ODR envi-
ronment.  One of the primary differences between private and public
ODR platforms, though, exists in the mechanism of enforcement of out-
comes.  For the public-based and/or judicially-supported ODR platforms,
enforcement can be done through several different mechanisms—the easi-
est of which is to have the local courts assist in enforcement should the
losing party fail to comply.  In this type of mechanism, no feedback, ac-
creditation or account restrictions are necessary to encourage compliance.
Instead, merchants agree to abide by particular rules and laws and allow a
public supported ODR system to resolve issues.124  One such example ex-
ists in Mexico.  The platform known as Concilianet is both hosted and sup-
ported by the government via the Federal Attorney’s Office of Consumer
(PROFECO).125  The Concilianet platform was created to resolve dis-
putes between registered merchants,126 and their customers.127  The pro-
cess is remarkable as it: (1) is straight forward; (2) has no direct filing
costs; (3) allows online and in-person filing; (4) uses verified forms of per-
sonal identification for registration of a claim; (5) complies with local law
on data retention and protection; (6) has trained assistants to assist the
consumer through the process; (7) uses a secured electronic data capture
and virtual courtroom throughout the process, and; (8) is able to resolve
the majority of claims within a short, consumer driven timeline.128  In fact,
122. Deborah Gage, VC Dispatch, Modria An Online ‘Small-Claims Court for 21st Cen-
tury’, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 20, 2012, 12:18 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB2000142412788
7324307204578129443877501274.html.
123. See Our Technology, MODRIA, http://www.modria.com/technology (last visited
July 31, 2014).
124. Such as what exists in the Concilianet system. See, e.g., ¿Que´ es?, CONCILIANET,
http://concilianet.profeco.gob.mx/concilianet/faces/que_es.jsp (last visited July 31, 2014).
125. Id. See generally, CONCILIANET, http://concilianet.profeco.gob.mx/concilianet/
faces/inicio.jsp (last visited July 31, 2014).
126. Eighty-seven merchants and their sub-merchants have registered. Proveedores
Participantes, CONCILIANET, http://concilianet.profeco.gob.mx/concilianet/faces/de_quien.jsp
(last visited July 31, 2014) (follow “Concilianet Descargar Documento” hyperlink).
127. See ¿Que´ es?, supra note 124.
128. See Paso a Paso, CONCILIANET, http://concilianet.profeco.gob.mx/concilianet/faces/
como_funciona.jsp (last visited Feb. 23, 2014); Preguntas Frecuentes, CONCILIANET, http://
concilianet.profeco.gob.mx/concilianet/faces/preguntas_frecuentes.jsp#preg8 (last visited July
31, 2014).
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even merchants not registered with the service can have a claim filed
against them, but the filing must be done in person (as use of the online
platform requires consent via registration) at a local satellite office.129  It is
also worth noting that the entire system is both voluntary and allows the
consumer to retain his right to his day in court,130 unlike, for example, the
binding decisions of Lok Adalats.
One of the better examples of a full service public-supported ODR
platform is currently in the testing stage within the province of British Co-
lumbia, Canada.131  Unlike previously described systems, the British Co-
lumbia ODR platform engages the business once the complaint is filed.132
At this initial stage the parties to the dispute agree to proceed with the
resolution process and also agree to have the outcome be final and binding
(i.e., arbitration).  Although the platform does not assist in the recovery,
should the losing party fail to comply, the final award can be taken to the
judicial system for enforcement.  This system is one of the better systems
that exist at this time because it allows the party to consent to participate
after the dispute has arisen and ends with a binding, court enforceable
outcome.133
As demonstrated through these examples, arbitration and mediation
are becoming more advanced and widely used within the justice system.
These ADR systems are slowly beginning to benefit from technology with
the next likely extension being the introduction of a true ODR platform,
such as the system described in British Columbia or the private system
Modria.  Some commentators argue that the emergence of ODR as a
means to relieve the pressure that exists in the backlogged justice system
should be a welcomed advance that will increase individuals’ access to jus-
tice,134 similar to how proponents discuss the benefits of Lok Adalats.135
While none of the previously discussed systems are perfect, they represent
the cutting edge in the ODR world.  However, some tough questions must
be asked before these platforms are fully embraced, especially in the area
of the use of automation.  The next section will consider some of the new-
est systems being designed to move ODR beyond domestic platforms
through an increased use of technology.
129. See Id.
130. See Preguntas Frecuentes, CONCILIANET, http://concilianet.profeco.gob.mx/con-
cilianet/faces/preguntas_frecuentes.jsp (last visited July 31, 2014).
131. Resolve Your Dispute, CONSUMER PROTECTION BC, http://www.consumerprotec
tionbc.ca/odr (last visited July 31, 2014).
132. See Frequently Asked Questions, CONSUMER PROTECTION BC, http://www.consum
erprotectionbc.ca/faqs (last visited July 31, 2014).
133. See Anjanette H. Raymond, Yeah, But Did You See the Gorilla? Creating and Pro-
tecting an ‘Informed’ Consumer In Cross Border Online Dispute Resolution, 19 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV., (forthcoming Spring 2014) [hereinafter Raymond, Gorilla].
134. See e.g., Devanesan & Aresty, supra note 8, at 293.
135. See, e.g., Patel, supra note 57.
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C. Cross Border Platforms: European Union ODR
In a similar manner as previously-discussed India, individuals within
the European Union suffer time delays and lack effective means to access
to justice, especially in the cross-border ecommerce environment. Accord-
ing to the 2013 European Union (E.U.) Justice Scoreboard, the majority of
European Union Member State courts take over 200 days to resolve a
litigious civil and commercial case,136 and many States have a high number
of such cases pending.137  However, a large majority of member states
have a well-developed system for the registration and management of
cases,138 including filing in small claims courts.139  And nearly all member
states report the availability of ADR methods,140 yet few have a full on-
line dispute resolution platform available, and none of which reach cross-
border trade.
It is important to note the cross border nature and importance of e-
commerce within the European Union. While numerous commentators,
economic institutions, and governmental authorities recognize the impor-
tance and value of growing cross border e-commerce, consumers seem
hesitant to risk the difficulties involved in cross border transactions.  Con-
sumers report four main areas of concern when shopping online in a cross
border transaction: (1) delivery timeframes and delays; (2) the ease of re-
placing or repairing a faulty product; (3) payment and reimbursement is-
sues; and (4) the misuse of payment card details and personal data.141
Consumers’ hesitation is reflected in their behavior, as European Commis-
sioner for Health and Consumer Policy Tonio Borg noted, “about one in
five EU consumers encounters a problem when buying goods or services
in the internal market.  Only a small fraction of these consumers currently
seek and secure effective redress.”142  In other words, access to justice is
thus being denied at an alarming rate across the European Union.
The denial of justice has been recognized as one reason that consum-
ers fail to shop within the cross-border internal market, especially when
the merchant is located in a legal system or culture that lacks effective
means of redress and consumer protections.143  For a region working hard
136. EUROPEAN COMM’N, THE EU JUSTICE SCOREBOARD (2013), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/justice_scoreboard_communication_en.pdf.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. See CIVIC CONSULTING, CONSUMER MARKET STUDY ON THE FUNCTIONING OF E-
COMMERCE AND INTERNET MARKETING AND SELLING TECHNIQUES IN THE RETAIL OF
GOODS 173 (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_research/mar-
ket_studies/docs/study_ecommerce_goods_en.pdf (reporting and evaluating a wide breadth
of information concerning online behavior and attitudes of consumers within Europe).
142. Borg Address, supra note 29.
143. See ACCENTURE, EUROPEAN CROSS-BORDER E-COMMERCE: THE CHALLENGE OF
ACHIEVING PROFITABLE GROWTH, IMPACT OF LAWS AND REGULATION 11, available at http:/
/www.accenture.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/PDF/Accenture-ERRT-Brochure.pdf.
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to remove boundaries in terms of trade, the absence of a cross-border dis-
pute resolution mechanism is a serious issue, as it greatly limits individu-
als’ willingness to shop outside their home country.144  As a result of these
findings and others, the European Union passed a first-of-its-kind ADR
Directive and corresponding ODR Regulation to facilitate the widespread
use of ODR across the European Union.145
The ADR Directive creates a procedure covering “all contractual dis-
putes in every market sector (e.g., travel, banking, dry cleaning), and in
every member state.”146  Similar to other systems,147 the ADR Directive
will require traders to “inform consumers about the availability of
ADR,148 will require traders to include and inform consumers about ADR
on their websites and in their general terms and conditions[,]”149 and will
require ADR entities “to meet quality criteria which guarantee that they
operate in an effective, fair, independent and transparent way.”150
In addition to the ADR Directive, the European Union has created an
ODR Regulation that will allow regionally located buyers and sellers to
resolve disputes within an online environment through the use of an on-
line platform.151  Interestingly, the online platform152 will have a commu-
144. In 2013, online retailing in Europe grew to £111.2 billion See Ctr. for Retail Res.:
http://www.retailresearch.org/onlineretailing.php. While in the U.S., in 2009, 154 million peo-
ple bought something online, or sixty-seven percent of the online population (four percent
more than in 2008). See Forrester Research, Forrester Research Web Influenced Retail Sales
Forecast, 3, (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.forrester.com.
145. “Member states will have twenty-four months after the entry into force of the Di-
rective to transpose it into their national legislation. That takes us to mid-2015. The ODR
platform will become operational six months after the end of the transposition period.” Alter-
native Dispute Resolution and Online Dispute Resolution, EUBUSINESS (Mar. 12, 2013), http://
www.eubusiness.com/topics/consumer/dispute-adr-odr/. The ADR Directive will not cover the
sectors of health and education as these areas are already heavily regulated and disputes
arise are often of a more complex nature. Press Release, European Comm’n, A Step Forward
For EU Consumers: Questions & Answers On Alternative Dispute Resolution And Online
Dispute Resolution (Mar. 12 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-
13-193_en.htm [hereinafter EUROPA, Press Release]. For the original website for the plat-
form, see Solving Your Consumer Disputes Out of Court (Alternative Dispute Resolution),
EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_en.htm (last visited July 31, 2014).
146. Alternative Dispute Resolution and Online Dispute Resolution, supra note 145; EU-
ROPA, Press Release, supra note 145.
147. Raymond, Gorilla, supra note 133.
148. Directive 2013/11/EU of The European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May
2013 on Alternative Dispute Resolution For Consumer Disputes, art. 7, 2013 O.J. (L 165)
[hereinafter ADR Directive].
149. Alternative Dispute Resolution and Online Dispute Resolution, supra note 145. See
EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 145.
150. Alternative Dispute Resolution and Online Dispute Resolution, supra note 145; see
ADR Directive, supra note 148 arts. 15-16; EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 145.
151. EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 145.
152. Regulation No. 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May
2013 On Online Dispute Resolution For Consumer Disputes, arts. 1–7, 2013 O.J. (L 165)
[hereinafter ODR Reg.].
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nication facility between the platform and the national ADR entities.153
As a result, the European Union will have successfully created a single
point of entry for resolving online disputes, regardless of domestic or
cross-border transactions. The platform will overcome prior barriers and
will be free of charge for all to use.154  In practice, consumers encounter-
ing a problem with an online purchase will be able to submit a complaint
online, in the language of their choice, through the ODR platform.155  As
would be expected, the ODR platform will serve as the sole communica-
tion device, allowing the parties to receive notices via the system156 and to
agree upon the ADR entity to resolve their dispute.157  Importantly, as
will be discussed later, it is arguable at this point that the ADR submission
agreement is created between the parties.158  “When they agree, the cho-
sen ADR entity will receive the details of the dispute via the ODR plat-
form.”159  Because “[t]he ODR platform will be connected to the national
ADR entities[,]160 the platform will allow national ODR advisors tasked
to “provide general information on consumer rights and redress in relation
to online purchases,”161 and “assist with the submission of complaints and
facilitate communication between the parties.”162  Most importantly, “the
new rules will provide for ADR entities to settle a dispute within 90
days[,]”163 a significantly quicker process than many existing small claims
courts throughout Europe.164
153. EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 145.
154. See ADR Directive, supra note 148, art. 9; EUROPA, Press Release, supra note
145.
155. See ODR Reg., supra note 152, art. 7; ADR Directive, supra note 148, art. 17;
EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 145.
156. EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 145.
157. See ODR Reg., supra note 152, arts. 5, 8; EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 145.
See also, Raymond, Gorilla, supra note 133,
158. Pre-dispute arbitration clauses are generally thought of as unfair contract terms
when E.U. consumers and their corresponding consumer protection laws are implicated in
the transaction. This is not the US position. See Ronald A. Brand, Party Autonomy and Ac-
cess to Justice in the UNCITRAL Online Dispute Resolution Project, 10 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L.
REV. 11, 27 (2012); Raymond, Gorilla, supra note 133.
159. Alternative Dispute Resolution and Online Dispute Resolution, supra note 145. See
ODR Reg., supra note 152, art. 8; EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 145.
160. Alternative Dispute Resolution and Online Dispute Resolution, supra note 145. See
ADR Directive, supra note 148, art. 27; ODR Reg., supra note 152 art. 6.
161. Including a high level of transparency about the process and prior outcomes, statis-
tics, etc. See ADR Directive, supra note 148, art. 7; Alternative Dispute Resolution and Online
Dispute Resolution, supra note 145.
162. Alternative Dispute Resolution and Online Dispute Resolution, supra note 145. See
ADR Directive, supra note 148, art. 11; EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 145.
163. Alternative Dispute Resolution and Online Dispute Resolution, supra note 145. See
ADR Directive, supra note 148, art. 8; EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 145.
164. For example, the Regulation on European small claims the gives the defendant
thirty days to respond to the complaint. Regulation 861/2007 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 11 July 2007 on Establishing a European Small Claims Procedure, art. 5,
2007 O.J. (L 199).
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It is important to note that the European Union legislation will affect
individuals’ access to justice in a substantial and real manner. As noted by
Commissioner Borg. “This improvement will not only prevent overbur-
dening court proceedings with low value affairs, but it is expected to moti-
vate consumers to seek redress in the first place.”165  The Commissioner’s
comments are reflective of the improvement of consumer protection
through the use of ADR and ODR.166  As noted by Dr. Ann Neville, Di-
rector of European Consumer Centre Ireland:
The ADR Directive and ODR Regulation when implemented will
allow business to consumer disputes to be settled fast, effectively
and cheaply without going to court.  Effective ADR offers both
business and consumers a win-win situation encouraging consum-
ers to spend secure in the knowledge that if something goes wrong
it is easy for them to access redress while business will avoid the
costs of going to court.167
Although some commentators doubt the veracity of these esti-
mates,168 few can argue against the numerous comprehensive research
studies that all point to the need to improve access to justice in the Euro-
pean Union, especially in cross-border situations. The creation of a nation-
ally supported ADR system as well as the support and monitoring of an
ODR platform will undoubtedly lead the way for future discussion both in
terms of access to justice and the widespread use of a public full service
platform.
D. United Nations Document on Cross-Border ODR
Despite the growing success of ODR in both public and private do-
mestic markets in many countries, the harmonized international cross bor-
der business to consumer (B2C) e-commerce alternative dispute
resolutions market is surprisingly non-existent.169  In fact, until recently,
no international legal body had even attempted to craft a cross border
legal instrument.  Currently, the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law is facilitating the most prominent work in the area.
Drawing its mandate from the U.N. General Assembly’s forty-third ses-
165. Id.
166. See generally Ho¨rnle, supra note 311.
167. EU2013, supra note 32.
168. See DEP’T FOR BUS., INNOVATION & SKILL, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE
CALL FOR EVIDENCE: EU PROPOSALS ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 9 (2012),
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
190192/12-674-government-response-eu-proposals-alternative-dispute-resolution_1_.pdf.
169. Rep. of the Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Working Group III (Online Dispute Res-
olution), 44th Sess., June 27–July 15, 2011, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/716 [hereinafter Working
Group III Rep.]. That is not to say that several regional and domestic systems do not exist,
many of which have served as an influence to the UN ODR text. See id. ¶¶ 32–34.
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sion,170 the United Nations Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) Working
Group has worked for four years to create a series of instruments to facili-
tate platform development in a three-phase dispute resolution process.171
The working Group is to create several instruments: (1) procedural rules;
(2) accreditation standards, and minimum requirements for ODR provid-
ers and platforms; (3) guidelines and minimum requirements for ODR
neutrals; (4) principles for resolving ODR disputes; and (5) a cross-border
enforcement mechanism.172  The ODR system is designed to create a
quick, simple, and inexpensive means of resolving disputes involving “low-
value, high-volume, cross-border, electronic commerce transactions.”173
To date, the UNCITRAL Working Group has decided to divide the
text into two tracks, one covering the business-to-business (B2B) platform,
and one covering the business-to-consumer (B2C) platform.174  In effect,
B2C disputes will be handled under a slightly different set of rules,175 pri-
marily because national laws differ in terms of consumer protections.176
One of the main sticking points is the differing laws in terms of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses and the final and binding nature of an arbitration
award.177  As a result of these substantial and important differences, the
current process envisions the parties making a declaration and the applica-
ble national law being applied via the neutral or the platform.178  The abil-
ity to make this declaration, within the platform itself, is a perfect example
of the increasing use and importance of technology within the dispute res-
olution world.  As consumers are able to select more options, the system
will send the individual down a different path of choices.
However, the drafting of the cross border text is a textbook example
of the problems associated with creating any cross-border instrument, es-
pecially when substantive law and enforcement is included within the in-
strument.  The sticking points of the group highlight major issues that will
need to be addressed by drafters within cross-border instruments, includ-
ing: (1) the need to coordinate any dispute resolution mechanism with na-
tional rules of private international law (conflict of laws); (2) the need to
ensure the enforcement of national law, such as consumer protection laws;
and (3) the need to coordinate with already existing international law,
such as the international arbitration law framework.179  Specifically in re-
170. Rep. of the Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 55th Sess., June 12–July 7, 2000, ¶ 385
U.N. Doc. A/55/17.
171. See generally Working Group III Rep., supra note 169.
172. See id., ¶ 115.
173. Working Group III Rep., supra note 169.
174. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolu-
tion), Online Dispute Resolution for Cross-Border Electronic Commerce Transactions: Draft
Procedural Rules, ¶¶ 6–7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.119 (Mar. 11, 2013).
175. This will require a declaration by the party to establish their status. See id. ¶¶ 8, 15.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. See Brand, supra note 158, at 11.
Spring 2014] Technology, Ethics, and Access to Justice 511
lation to the design of an ODR mechanism, the difficulties within the
drafting of this text highlight the complexities and the importance of im-
plementing a mechanism for the rapid and simple enforcement of
outcomes.180
The process and the difficulties associated with creating a cross-border
ODR instrument should not be overlooked.181  Cross-border issues relat-
ing to the access to justice—be they consumer protection, privacy rights,
or even right of expression—will continue to be sticking points for legisla-
tive drafting. Technology can help overcome many of the boundary based-
issues, but some commentators are quietly asking if technology will be
able to adequately apply applicable local law in an appropriate manner.182
IV. TOWARD A TECHNOLOGY-BASED ODR PLATFORM
The absence of simple, cost-effective, fair, and transparent third-party
administered online dispute resolution platforms denies access to justice to
many individuals seeking redress of grievances.  Even with the success of
Lok Adalats in India, for example, millions of cases remain pending.
Technology can be used to greatly improve individuals’ access to justice.
As more stakeholders begin to use online platforms as small claims courts,
one must ask what the future of dispute resolution will look like.  In many
ways, the regions of the world surveyed are far apart in determining the
best manner in which to use technology within the justice system.  This
section will consider next steps, gaze into the crystal ball to predict
problems arising within ODR systems, and make a modest suggestion for
resolving some of these issues.
A. What is Coming Next in ODR
While many justice systems are beginning to embrace ADR, some sec-
tors, particularly those that dislike mandatory arbitration clauses within
contracts of adhesion, are beginning to question the widespread use of
ADR.183  The growing hesitations toward widespread use of ADR will
180. See Raymond, Gorilla, supra note 133.
181. This raises the issue of to what extent the Internet should be considered a
“borderless” environment. Two schools of thought play out, one depicting cyberspace as a
commons largely free from governmental interference, while the other considers cyberspace
to be an extension of national territory. See, e.g., Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the
Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 439, 519 (2003) (depicting cyberspace
as a traditional commons and warning that inaction will lead to an intractable digital anti-
commons); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyber-
space, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996) (arguing that “[g]lobal computer-based communi-
cations cut across territorial borders, creating a new realm of human activity and
undermining the feasibility—and legitimacy—of laws based on geographic boundaries”).
182. This is based on the authors’ own first-hand knowledge of discussions.
183. See generally, Anjanette H. Raymond, It Is Time the Law Begins to Protect Con-
sumers from Significantly One-Sided Arbitration Clauses within Contracts of Adhesion, 91
NEB. L. REV. 666 (2013) (discussing the use of contracts of adhesion in light of the recent
Supreme Court case AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion)) [hereinafter Raymond, Protecting
Consumers].
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likely extend to ODR.  Founded in distrust of an unknown system, individ-
uals’ hesitation may be well placed as the ODR system lacks legal protec-
tions and is created by a business community that may not always have the
best interest of the consumer as its priority.184  As can be seen above, this
distrust by consumers of ADR is starting a groundswell of legislative re-
sponse in India and the European Union.  A similar movement is also
underway in the United States, as is discussed next.
The regulation of ODR, though, is taking a drastically different form
in various jurisdictions, which in the long run may lead to fundamentally
different forms of ODR.  For example, within the next ten years it is likely
that many disputes within the European Union will be resolved online in a
virtual small claims court.185  Individuals will have the ability, should they
choose, to file a claim online, submit the information, seek assistance from
local authorities, and resolve the dispute via the use of a multilingual (po-
tentially mobile) online platform.  As a matter of importance, one must
appreciate these platforms will be monitored and will be subject to gov-
ernmental intervention.  These are public justice systems that are merely
delivered in an online environment.
In contrast to the European Union, the United States has long recog-
nized parties’ ability to contract as they see fit, with few exceptions or
limitations, even in the field of dispute resolution clauses.186  The wide
support for parties’ ability to contract for dispute resolution has led to the
growth of the dispute resolution industry. These entities provide dispute
resolution services within the context of a business endeavor with no regu-
lation, or oversight and few restrictions. In the United States,, dispute res-
olution is a creature of contract, which allows for wide deference to be
given to the parties’ agreement to resolve the dispute as the parties see fit.
Of course, the issue is that these clauses are often not a product of negoti-
ations, leaving the business to craft the clause.  The agreement will un-
doubtedly contain consent to participate in the platform and will likely
include consent for a high level of automation and technology, without
necessitating any due process protections. Of course, platform designers
may elect to respect due process and consumer protections, but there is no
requirement to do so within the United States. Unlike the public systems
of the European Union, Mexico, and to a lesser extent India,187 these pri-
vate platforms will have no oversight and no judicial connection.  Also,
unlike the European Union,188 the U.S. judicial system, especially the U.S.
Supreme Court,189 will support the decisions generated from these plat-
184. See, e.g., William Black, How Trust is Abused in Free Markets: Enron’s ‘Crooked
‘E’, SSRN (Jan. 16, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1536532 (last
visited July 31, 2014).
185. See EU2013, supra note 32 (comments of Dr. Ann Neville).
186. See Raymond, Gorilla, supra note 133.
187. See discussion supra Part III.C.
188. See discussion supra Parts II.A, III.B, III.C.
189. See Raymond, Gorilla, supra note 133; Raymond, Protecting Consumers, supra
note 183.
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forms as the parties agreed to resolve their dispute in arbitration and the
Federal Arbitration Act strongly favors arbitration.190  There is nothing to
suggest that challenges to the use of technology, including automated plat-
forms, will cause any issues as these platforms will be used with the con-
sent of the parties.191  As a result, these private ODR platforms will likely
include arbitration as a final stage of resolution and the award may be
easily enforceable in a local court system, irrespective of the use of an
algorithm.
As the ODR community looks ahead, many within the community are
going to the extremes and arguing that ODR can become a fully auto-
mated process.192  In fact, platforms such as Cybersettle193 and Clicknset-
tle194 allow parties to settle their dispute with no human intervention
whatsoever.  This new breed of ODR is an algorithmic process, not merely
an online communications device used to facilitate discussions between
the parties.  For example, there are now more than one platform that exist
that are designed as “completely automated web based communications
tool[s]”195 allowing parties to communicate via the platform and attempt
to reach a settlement amongst themselves.196  The newest platforms, how-
ever, use automation for the majority—and in some cases all—of the pro-
cess.197  In fact, in 2006 prominent dispute resolution author Professor Dr.
Morek argued, “[S]oftware is designed to support, and in certain instances
replace ‘live’ neutrals.  Thus, the role of technology in ODR must not be
underestimated.”198  The next generation of ADR will likely be partially
or fully automated online dispute resolution, a logical extension of the
same drive for efficiency that has fueled India’s quest to enhance judicial
efficiency through implementing ADR reform generally and Lok Adalats
specifically.  As a result, it is no longer merely enough for us to “think
whether, when dealing with disputes, we need to physically converge in
courts.”199  It is now time for us to begin asking how much technology
should be used in dispute resolution, in what circumstances, and at what
cost?
190. See Raymond, Gorilla, supra note 133.
191. See id.
192. See Gage, supra note 122.
193. See CYBERSETTLE, http://www.cybersettle.com (last visited July 31, 2014). The
website is now less descriptive about the Cybersettle platform and more about the new initia-
tive in payment. For a full discussion, see Dusty Bates Farned, A New Automated Class Of
Online Dispute Resolution: Changing The Meaning Of Computer-Mediated Communication,
2 FAULK. L. R 335, 338–46 (2011); Goodman, supra note 9.
194. Richard Michael Victorio, Internet Dispute Resolution (IDR): Bringing ADR Into
the 21st Century, 1 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 279, 287–88 (2001).
195. Goodman, supra note 9.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 12.
198. Rafal Morek, The Regulatory Framework for Online Dispute Resolution: A Critical
View, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 163, 178 (2006).
199. Susskind Attacks CJC for Dismissing Online Dispute Resolution, supra note 1.
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B. ODR Platforms Need Automation to Survive
As was previously stated, the private full service platforms, such as
Modria, are touted as the “small-claims court for the 21st century.”200  In
fact, Modria may end up being the first cross-border small claims court.
The survival of the Modria platform is not guaranteed as the majority of
private ODR platforms have failed.  In fact, a review of “ten Years of
ADR” completed in 2006 by Ethan Katsh201 sheds light on the sheer num-
ber of platforms that no longer exist as ODR entities.  Many creators of
these platforms cite one primary reason for failure: cost.202  In fact, public
dispute resolution platforms have also suffered and failed due to the costs
associated with the platform and the administration of justice, even in a
publicly supported platform.  Even in the private context, these costs are
difficult to pass on to the user as the dispute in question often involves a
small value dispute around $5.00.  Few people will pay $5.00 to resolve a
$5.00 dispute.  Consequently, platform designers are left with a serious
question of how to fund the project.  And if the projects  can find funding,
how will the providers maintain the platform over time when the costs are
high?
For technology enthusiasts the answer to this question is almost obvi-
ous—reduce costs by automating as much of the system as possible and
then further reduce costs by removing the most costly element of the plat-
form, i.e., the human neutral decision maker.  This approach is already
being reflected by platform designers, as enumerated by the Modria team
in the Wall Street Journal.  “Modria’s goal is to resolve about 90% of cases
through software, without humans.”203  Indeed, automation of a large part
of the ODR system is already being used in both private and public alter-
native justice systems.  As has been discussed, numerous systems allow
online decision support systems that permit everything from electronic fil-
ing of claims to the filing of forms and similar submissions of informa-
tion.204  In fact, some negotiation support systems, such as DEUS, allowed
the parties to communicate within the platform, to exchange offers, and to
view graphs and other interactive tools used to compare the current offer
to initial offers and the expectations that lead to the offer.205  Moreover, a
200. Gage, supra note 122.
201. See generally Ethan Katsh & Leah Wing, Ten Years of Online Dispute Resolution
(ODR): Looking at the Past and Constructing the Future, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 101 (2006)
(discussing the progression of ODR and the various platforms that have succeeded and
failed).
202. See Nicholas W. Vermeys & Karim Benyekhlef, ODR and the Courts, in ONLINE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, supra note 8, at 295, 298–99 (discussing Michigan’s Cyber Court and the loss of
funding as one looming reason behind the projects abandonment).
203. Gage, supra note 122.
204. See supra Part 3.2.
205. See Arno R. Lodder & John Zeleznikow, Artifical Intellegence and Online Dispute
Resolution, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, A TREATISE ON
TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 8, at 61, 63–64.
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few private systems exist that allow for logarithms and other types of tech-
nology based metrics to be employed in online mediation as intelligent
negotiation support.206  In these systems, parties rank and value each issue
within the dispute by allocating a sum amongst all issues.207  The platform
then uses the numbers to optimize each other’s desires and to make sug-
gestions of a fair outcome.208  These platforms, such as the well-known
Smartsettle, assist the parties in clarifying interests, identifying trade-offs,
and generate optimal solutions.209
However, artificial intelligence and algorithms, such as intelligent ne-
gotiated support systems, are newer to ODR—but that should not be read
to assume this technology is not established.  For example, case-based rea-
soning systems,210 such as PERSUADER, integrate “case based reasoning
and game theory to provide decision support.”211  Within the now expired
platform, the application of case-based reasoning lead to the parties being
able to explore suggested “solutions, to debug proposed solutions, and to
persuade a disputant of the utility of a solution.”212  The most important
aspect of case-based reasoning is to be “able to utilize the specific knowl-
edge of previously experienced, concrete problem situations (cases).  A
new problem is solved by finding a similar past case, and reusing it in the
new problem situation.”213  But even though the system was widely re-
garded as groundbreaking and received much attention, case-based rea-
soning was only the first stage in artificial intelligent design.  Today, the
use of algorithms and case-based learning is essential to any modern plat-
form.  For example, noted eNegotiation authors Ernest Thiessen, Paul
Miniato, and Bruce Hiebert, suggest:
When a negotiation problem is modeled, a computer can act as an
intelligent agent using optimization algorithms [sic] that seek the
best solution.  Such algorithms create a representation of party
preferences that can be used to generate packages (bundled posi-
tions on issues) that are helpful in the process.  Such suggestions
for resolution can be based on private information that remains
private to the parties but is visible to the neutral eNegotiation sys-
tem.  A computer generated package can encourage the process,
206. Id.
207. Id. at 65.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 64–65.
210. See generally, Agnar Aamodt & Enric Plaza, Case-Based Reasoning: Foundational
Issues, Methodological Variations, and System Approaches, 7 ARIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
COMM. 39 (1994), available at http://www.iiia.csic.es/People/enric/AICom.html.
211. Emilia Bellucci & John Zeleznikow, AI Techniques for Modeling Legal Negotia-
tion, 1999 PROC. OF THE 7TH INT’L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & THE L. 108;
Aamodt & Plaza, supra note 210 at 40–45.
212. Janet Kolodner, Case-Based Reasoners, GATECH.EDU, http://home.cc.gatech.edu/
jlk/10.print (last visited July 31, 2014).
213. Aamodt & Plaza, supra note 210 at 39.
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resolve impasses, and improve negotiated agreements—all with-
out reducing the control of the process by the negotiating parties.
Optimization algorithms utilize detailed and highly accurate infor-
mation from all parties, information that they would never pro-
vide each other and in some cases not entrust to a human
mediator.  With anything other than the very simplest of cases,
this optimization is beyond the capabilities of any unassisted
human.214
eNegotiation, like so many aspects of our lives benefits from technol-
ogy, especially the gathering and use of information to identify patterns
and predict responses.  As these systems continue to become more ad-
vanced—and contain more information—there will be little argument
against the continuing increased use of these platforms.  The cost savings
per individual dispute, the ability to quickly and fairly resolve individual
disputes, and the ability to resolve massive numbers of disputes—all while
learning from each outcome—will likely lead to an increased use in auto-
mation technology and algorithms in ODR.
C. A Balance Must be Struck between Efficiency and Justice
Despite the growing chorus of arguments supporting the wider use of
technology in dispute resolution, one must ask how much technology indi-
viduals will allow before doubting the legitimacy of the online justice sys-
tem.  According to Professor Amy Gangl, three factors affect the
assessment of the legitimacy of a judicial decision.215  First, individuals
must believe that the decision-making process takes their views into ac-
count.216  Second, decision making should be neutral and all opinions
must be granted equal consideration without favoritism.217  Third, citizens
must trust the judicial system and its representatives.218  Of course, each
of these issues is ever present in current ODR platform design debate.  All
of these assessment points demand that we first examine one essential
question—is the increasing use of technology a challenge to the legitimacy
of the alternative justice system?
As a case in point, in 2002, Michigan enacted legislation creating a
court-annexed ODR project colloquially titled ‘Cyber Court.’219  For the
214. Ernest Thiessen, Paul Miniato & Bruce Hiebert, ODR and eNegotiation, in ON-
LINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND
DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 8, at 329, 333.
215. Amy Gangl, Procedural Justice Theory and Evaluations of the Lawmaking Process,
25 POL. BEHAV. 119, 121 (2003).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. The once promising domain of http://www.michigancybercourt.net is now a traffic-
forwarding page for a California law firm. See H.B 4104 (Mich. 2002). See also, Lucille M.
Ponte, The Michigan Cyber Court: A Bold Experiment in the Development of the First Public
Virtual Courthouse, 4 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 51, 55 (2002) (discussing the court in detail).
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purposes of this Article, the full explanation of the system is best left to
other researchers; suffice it to say, it was a full-service online cyber
court.220  For our purposes, it is important to note that the project was
ultimately abandoned. Some authorities argue it was the loss of funding
that was the major issue in this case;221 however, others note a ground-
swell of criticism ranging from “reluctance of parties and lawyers to gam-
ble on an untested system,”222 to a general distrust of technology,223
misunderstanding or failing to understand the system,224 and a concern
from witnesses and parties that the information they shared would not be
appropriately protected from wider release.225  Mistrust of the system,
even if the mistrust is based in wrong assumptions, is a fundamental issue
within ODR, just as it can be with ADR, generally.
To overcome this mistrust, platform designers and policymakers must
consider three issues.  First, despite what ODR enthusiasts may suggest,
automation should not be used for every dispute.  Legitimacy is in the eye
of the beholder, and a balance must be struck between promoting effi-
ciency and ensuring the procedural protections inherent to improving ac-
cess to justice.  As demonstrated by consumer behavior in the European
Union and the resulting legislation as well as the failure of the Michigan
online platform,226 to name but a few examples, individuals are still not
ready to be engaged in an automated process relying on an algorithm in
every instance.  Updating basic information, handling minor disputes and
similar actions is probably within the realm of acceptability as is communi-
cating through an online platform.  However, full automation including
the use of algorithms to decide child custody, discrimination cases, and
other highly regulated and important issues, is probably still a step too far
for many individuals.  Rooting such processes, to the extent possible, in
history and cultural norms, such as the Lok Adalats have attempted,227
might help ameliorate some of these concerns.  However, one must still
recognize and appreciate when the process has lost legitimacy because of
the overuse of technology.
Second, the ODR system must also meet standards of legitimacy.228
Noted authors Ruha Devanesan and Jeffrey Aresty emphasize a familiar
set of legitimacy criteria for the ODR system: transparency, (“readily-ac-
220. See Marc Shulman, Cyber Court in Michigan, 80 MICH. B.J. 45, 45 (2001), cited in
Vermeys & Benyekhlef, supra note 202, at 298–99.
221. See Vermeys & Benyekhlef, supra note 202, at 298–99, 310.
222. See Brian A. Pappas, Online Court, 12 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 10 (2008) cited and
commented on in Vermeys & Benyekhlef, supra note 202, at 299–300.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See supra, text accompanying note 141.
227. See Martinez et al., supra note 53, at 809.
228. See infra discussion accompanying Part V.2. (regarding the legitimacy of polycen-
tric regulation).
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cessible information about all aspects of their [ODR] services”),229 inde-
pendence and impartiality (operating independently from business and
government interest and without bias favoring those interests), effective-
ness (means to ensure compliance), accessibility (ease of use), flexibility
(ability to adapt to circumstances of the dispute), fairness and integrity
(observe due process standards), and affordability (“particularly in light of
the amount of compensation sought”).230  When considering these criteria,
India serves as a reminder of the problems associated with a questionable
public ADR system.
India has implemented a fast track court in an effort to improve the
time it takes for the court to resolve disputes.  However, the system has
been created with inadequate procedural protections and absent larger
rule of law reforms, as was discussed in Part II.  For example, in the “Best
Bakery” case, fourteen Muslims were murdered in Vadadara on March 1,
2002.  All twenty-one of the accused were acquitted by the Fast Track
Court of H.U. Mahida despite questionable decisions regarding witness
testimony and a lack of effective cross-examination.231  The National
Human Rights Commission (NHRC), in its Special Leave Petition to the
Supreme Court of India, argued against the verdict.  The NHRC petition
stated, “instead of making efforts to strengthen the prosecution case, it
appears that the steps to the contrary were being taken.”232  At the time,
the judges themselves who first decided the case recognized the ludicrous-
ness of the situation.  “The court of justice is not a court of justice in the
real sense, but it is a court of evidence,” Judge Mahida remarked in his
judgment.233  Regardless, the fast track court enjoys powers, including
holding the investigation en camera, but chose to abrogate them resulting
in a gross miscarriage of justice.234
This episode underscores the true cost of the lack of procedural pro-
tections in Lok Adalats and other fast track courts, with potential lessons
for ODR as well.  As the ODR system matures and becomes even more
widely utilized, it could eventually result in the creation of a parallel sys-
tem of rapid “cheap” justice lacking the procedural protections inherent in
courts of law.  Policymakers should avoid a similar outcome in which the
proscribed cure was more detrimental than the original disease.
Third, and finally, of equal importance when considering legitimacy is
the trend in the U.S. justice system to allow unregulated, private ODR
systems to administer justice.235  When private actors are allowed to ad-
229. Anita Ramasastry, Government-to-Citizen Online Dispute Resolution: A Prelimi-
nary Inquiry, 79 WASH. L. REV. 159, 173 (2004).
230. Id. See also Devanesan & Aresty, supra note 8, at 265.
231. See, e.g., Sonia Sarkar, Need for Speed, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 30, 2013), http://
www.telegraphindia.com/1130130/jsp/opinion/story_16499488.jsp#.UemvhVOoXF8.
232. Sridhar, Miscarriage of Fast Track Justice, supra note 44.
233. Id.
234. The Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the NHRC and ordered a new trial in a
court of law. See id.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 198–203.
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minister justice we must demand a higher level of scrutiny.  This is espe-
cially true when the ODR system gathers its authority from the consent of
the parties via a contract of adhesion and provides no alternative other
than the ODR platform to resolve the dispute.  Within the domestic U.S.
context, the Supreme Court has ruled that ADR, especially arbitration, is
a creature of contract and subject to traditional contract interpretation and
enforcement.236  Within U.S. law, without legislative guidance or regula-
tion, the use of automation will presumptively be determined as a matter
of contract law as the use of automation will be just one term within the
larger ADR contract clause.  As such, the unregulated nature of the
emerging private automated justice system should give us more than a mo-
ment pause as the absence of regulation fails to ensure a balance between
justice and efficiency, thereby eroding the legitimacy of the system.
D. Ethical Dilemmas Should Not be Overlooked
It is important to recognize that an increased recognition of the need
to improve access to justice may lead to some unfortunate ethical dilem-
mas.  For example, the ADR movement in India is having real effects, and
has become so successful in some ways that it has, perhaps paradoxically,
led to questions regarding the pressure placed on individuals for a quick
resolution.  This passage raises the ugly possibility of coercion behind at
least some percentage of India’s ADR success.  Of course, this passage
takes on additional significance as the arbitration award is binding under
the Indian Arbitration Act.237  With systems such as this, potential ethical
issues abound as the arbitrator is empowered to resolve the dispute be-
tween the parties without many procedural protections but with all of the
powers inherent in courts of law.
As private businesses begin to become justice providers one must also
consider conflicts of interest.  For example, in as recently as 2000 an entity
known as “Insurance Services Office, Inc., which provided consulting and
technical services to insurance brokers and companies, purchased sixteen
percent, or $4 million, of the NAM Corporation through shares, which
operates clickNsettle.com and provides mediation and arbitration ser-
236. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (holding
an arbitration agreement enforceable despite State laws of unconscionability); Volt Info. Sci.,
Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (explaining basic
purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to overcome courts’ refusals to enforce agreements
to arbitrate); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-220 (1985) (holding Con-
gress intended courts to “enforce [arbitration] agreements into which parties had entered,”
and to “place such agreements ‘upon the same footing as other contracts’”); see also Stephen
L. Hayford, Commercial Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court 1983-1995: A Sea Change,
31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1996); Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitra-
tion in Evolution: An Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 343
(1995); Stephen L. Hayford, Law In Disarray: Judicial Standards For Vacatur Of Commercial
Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731 (1996).
237. Martinez et al., supra note 53, at 809.
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vices.”238  One can expect purchases of this type to raise concerns about
the objectivity and impartiality of a business to handle certain types of
disputes.239  As business entities allow justice to be provided by fellow
business entities, we must begin to ask how to handle conflicts that will
inevitably exist when close business associates decide cases or run busi-
nesses that dispense justice.
Private justice raises important issues of ethical considerations in
ADR and ODR design.  Although such an important and complex topic
deserves deep examination, for now we simply note that the rush to ADR,
which has as its ultimate form fully-automated ODR, raises profound ethi-
cal issues about the nature of justice and what role constitutionally-guar-
anteed due process protections will play in the everyday resolution of
disputes in the twenty-first century.  Further research is required to ex-
plore the implications prior to widespread adoption of ODR as a true
mechanism of justice.240  As noted by the Madras High Court, “justice has
to be imparted: [sic] justice cannot be hurried to be buried. We have to
‘decide’ the cases and not just ‘dispose them of (sic).’”241
V. THE NEED FOR REGULATION AND A NEW APPROACH
This Article has explored comparative ADR and ODR efforts as an
access to justice issue, focusing on India, the European Union, and the
United States relying on India as an illustrative example.  The importance
of regulation to increase accountability in ADR and ODR system design
has been mentioned throughout.  This Part begins the process of unrav-
eling what such regulation might look like and how it could strike the deli-
238. Thomas Schultz, An Essay on the Role of Government for ODR: Theoretical Con-
siderations About the Future of ODR, 2003 PROC. OF THE UNECE FORUM ON ODR 1, 6 n.
11; see also Press Release, ISO, Nam Corporation, Parent Company Of Clicknsettle. Com,
Announces That Insurance Services Office, Inc., Acquires 16 Percent Stake In Nam (May 11,
2000), available at http://www.iso.com/Press-Releases/2000/NAM-CORPORATION-PAR
ENT-COMPANY-OF-CLICKNSETTLE.COM-ANNOUNCES-THATINSURANCE-SER
VICES-OFFICE-INC.html; see also, Lucille M. Ponte, Throwing Bad Money After Bad: Can
Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) Really Deliver the Goods for the Unhappy Internet Shop-
per?, 3 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 55, 87 (2001) (discussing the issues associated with
such a conflict of interest).
239. See, e.g., Allen Scott Rau, On Integrity in Private Judging, 14 ARB. INT’L 115, 115
(1998). “There are those among us who view arbitration primarily as a business. They are
likely to concentrate more on self-interest than the interest of the profession . . . We recog-
nize that arbitrators are no less ambitious than other professionals; we recognize that many
of us are dependent on arbitration fees for a livelihood. But self-serving instincts must always
be subordinated to the need to uphold the integrity and honor of the profession.” Id. (quot-
ing Report of Special Committee on Professionalism of National Academy of Arbitrators
(1987), DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) 106, E1, E4).
240. For further information on this topic, see Scott J. Shackelford & Anjanette H. Ray-
mond, Building the Virtual Courthouse: Ethical Considerations for Design, Implementation,
and Regulation in the World of ODR, 2014 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
241. Chief Justice R.C. Lahoti, Keynote Address Delivered at the Conference of the
Chief Ministers of States and the Chief Justices of High Courts: Envisioning Justice in the
21st Century (Sept. 18, 2004).
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cate balance between promoting accountability without unduly affecting
innovation in a rapidly changing legal environment.
A. Access to Justice Must be Regulated
Regulatory theorists have identified an array of modalities that may
be used to control patterns of behavior within complex systems.242  These
include strategies ranging from command and control to self-regulation
including relying on markets to reach a desired outcome,243 such as en-
hancing access to justice.  Professor Lawrence Lessig identified four mo-
dalities of cyber regulation, which are architecture. law, the market, and
norms that may be used individually or collectively by policymakers.244
These modalities are mentioned here since it is important to recognize that
policymakers are far from the only regulators of ADR and ODR systems.
For ODR in particular, the code giving rise to the architecture of the sys-
tem itself is a critical determinant, which is in turn shaped by other consid-
erations including the market and consumer preferences.  Thus, consumer
education to establish norms and expectations about necessary procedural
protections in rapidly expanding ADR is vital to its ultimate success.
Most systems that are treated as a means to improve access to justice
must be regulated, especially in situations where the outcome is to be en-
forced by the court with minimalist review.  However, as can be seen from
the above ODR platforms, many providers are currently within the private
sector and are given authority via contract.  Currently, little regulation ex-
ists to prevent providers from focusing on cost and efficiency over due
process.  One should be hesitant, however, to respond with hostility to po-
tential issues with a private ODR platform as none are currently in wide-
spread use.  As such, minimalistic intervention prior to the maturity of the
ODR industry seems preferable, though it is also true that the system will
be difficult to change once it is fully implemented.  Moreover, the creation
of an international standard of due process minimum standards within al-
ternative dispute resolution already exists.  The New York Convention has
long provided due process protections in arbitration involving cross-bor-
der international business to business commercial disputes.245  One can
242. See ANDREW D. MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: CONTROL IN THE
ONLINE ENVIRONMENT 29 (2007).
243. See id. at 28 (comparing how the regulatory strategies modeled by professors Bald-
win and Cave, Thatcher, and Lessig might be applied to cyberspace); ROBERT BALDWIN &
MARTIN CAVE, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION 34 (1999) (categorizing regulatory strategies
based on whether governments use resources to command, to deploy wealth, to harness mar-
kets, to inform, to act directly, or to confer protected rights).
244. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662–63
(1998) (describing four constraints or modalities of regulation—law, norms, the market, and
architecture—that “constitute a sum of forces that guide an individual to behave, or act, in a
given way”).
245. For example, Article V provides for basic due process protections such as the right
to receive notice, the right to present the case. United Nations Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330
U.N.T.S. 3.
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imagine a day when these commercial business protections are afforded to
all consumers entering into all ADR agreements.  That day is far from
here as the UN Working Group III has discovered that few nations can
agree on the best means to protect online consumers.246  Consequently,
international regulation on improving access to justice will not likely be
forthcoming for the foreseeable future as consumer protections often
stand in the way.
The increasing use of algorithms is an issue anticipated by the Euro-
pean Union ADR Directive, which requires natural persons to be in
charge of ADR and to possess the necessary expertise and demonstrate
impartiality from both parties.  Unfortunately, as drafted, there is no clar-
ity in the provision,247 which leaves the definition of ‘be in
charge’openended.  One has to consider the real possibility that a natural
person will have review oversight and will not actually participate fully in
the decision-making process.  While this is a step in the right direction, it
misses at least three key issues that must be addressed.
Requiring a natural person to be in charge of all ADR and ODR is
likely a step too far.  Many disputes can be resolved without a natural
person.  Automation, artificial intelligence, and algorithms are not pre-
sumptively bad—especially in the low-value online sales context.  The sys-
tem must ensure due process, including transparency and neutral decision
making algorithms, but a natural person is often not needed to accomplish
that feat.  In fact, a well-designed artificial intelligence algorithm could be
bias free (at least to the extent that the programmers are also bias free),
which is an advantage that cannot truly be guaranteed with human actors.
Regulation, though, may well be needed to ensure any artificial intelli-
gence uses a decision matrix that is bias free.  But any regulation, be it at
an international level or a regional or domestic level, must start from a
position of increasing trust in the system, with the focus placed on protect-
ing due process entitlements.  The usual, throw the baby out with the
bathwater approach, so often embraced by anti-ADR advocates,248 must
be rejected as a well-designed, ODR platform can protect individuals’ due
process entitlements.  However, as the India case study demonstrates,
some minimalist regulation may be required to promote access to justice.
B. Polycentric Regulation
Given the slow progress of U.N. efforts to increase access to justice,
policymakers at the national and regional levels are undertaking regula-
tory interventions described in the U.S., European Union, and Indian case
studies above.  Such initiatives may be conceptualized as a polycentric ap-
proach to enhancing access to justice, a fact that has been underap-
246. See supra, discussion and footnotes accompanying Part III.D.
247. See ADR Directive, supra note 148, arts. 15–16.
248. Such as those that continue to introduce Congressional Act designed to eliminate
the use of ADR. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, 113th Cong. (1st Sess.
2013).
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preciated in the literature.249  Polycentrism has arisen across an array of
disciplines, from law to urban studies, and involves the study of multiple
power centers in a given environment.250  Professor Vincent Ostrom de-
fined a “polycentric” order as “one where many elements are capable of
making mutual adjustments for ordering their relationships with one an-
other within a general system of rules where each element acts with inde-
pendence of other elements.”251  This approach recognizes that the state is
only one of many actors in a polycentric system.252  It is the desire to ad-
dress some common concern that ties together the various state and non-
state actors in a polycentric system, which can then enjoy “mutual moni-
toring, learning, and adaptation of better strategies over time.”253
Polycentric regulation may provide a path forward to enhance proce-
dural protections and improve access to justice in the ADR and ODR
context.  Indeed, Professor Elinor Ostrom created an informative frame-
work of eight design principles for the development of polycentric sys-
tems.254  Not all of Professor Ostrom’s design principles are applicable in
the ADR context, but several have some salience.  For example, the im-
portance of monitoring, the need to establish enforceable norms of behav-
ior, and, above all, the requirement of graduated sanctions and low-cost,
legitimate conflict resolution systems are critical for the continued uptake
of ADR and ODR.  Indian, U.S., and European Union policymakers
should take this into account, as should international negotiators at the
U.N.  Indeed, another insight of polycentric regulation is that an inflexible
comprehensive international regime could actually stifle innovation by
crowding out smaller-scale efforts that might be more effective at enhanc-
ing access to justice.255  The vital role of the private sector and nations
249. But see Dana Brakman Reiser & Claire R. Kelly, Linking NGO Accountability and
the Legitimacy of Global Governance, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1011, 1013 (2011) (discussing
polycentric regulation in the human rights NGO context); S. P. Sathe, Judicial Activism: The
Indian Experience, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 29, 69–71 (2001) (calling for “a more par-
ticipatory, polycentric, and result oriented judicial process” in the Indian context).
250. See, e.g., SURYA PRAKASH SINHA, LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1-17 (1996); Robert C. Kloosterman & Sako Musterd, The Polycentric Urban Region:
Toward a Research Agenda, 38 URBAN STUD. 623, 623 (2001).
251. Vincent Ostrom, Polycentricity (Part 1), in POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC
ECONOMIES: READINGS FROM THE WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY AND POLICY ANALY-
SIS 52, 57 (Michael Dean McGinnis ed., 1999).
252. See Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in
Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137, 137–40 (2008).
253. Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global
Environmental Change, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 550, 552 (2010) [hereinafter E. Ostrom,
Polycentric Systems] (“Polycentric systems are characterized by multiple governing authori-
ties at differing scales rather than a monocentric unit”).
254. See Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems: Multilevel Governance Involving a Diver-
sity of Organizations, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMONS: ANALYTICAL AND POLITICAL
CHALLENGES INVOLVING A DIVERSITY OF ORGANIZATIONS 105, 117-18 (Eric Brousseau et
al. eds., 2012).
255. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of
Complex Economic Systems, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 641, 656 (2010) (citing Andrew F. Reeson
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acting as laboratories to identify best practices is also part and parcel of
polycentric regulation, which recognizes the importance of such bottom-
up efforts.  Thus, small like-minded, public-private groupings of key stake-
holders should be created to continue the debate about how to improve
access to justice across regions, if nothing else as a starting point until fur-
ther multilateral progress is made.
Polycentric regulation has its faults, but so does waiting for a consen-
sual approach that could come too late to improve access to justice, if at
all.  Effective polycentric governance is predicated on the difficult task of
getting diverse stakeholders to work well together across sectors and bor-
ders, while the absence of hierarchical control threatens gridlock.  But this
conceptual framework has the potential to move the debate about improv-
ing access to justice through ADR and ODR in a more productive direc-
tion.256  However, the digital equivalent of field studies needs to be
undertaken using innovative methodologies to explore the benefits and
drawbacks of applying polycentric governance to these novel contexts.
CONCLUSION
This Article has considered ADR and ODR in India, the U.S., and
European Union through the lens of access to justice.  It demonstrated
that while public and private ADR and ODR systems have the potential,
and indeed in many cases already are, improving efficiency sorely lacking
at times in the formal public justice system, the widespread adoption of
these systems also risks sacrificing due process protections critical to the
functioning of a healthy democracy.  This is especially apparent in the case
of fully automated ODR, which, in its worst manifestation, could lack due
process protections yet be automatically enforceable in courts without the
possibility of judicial review.  The ongoing debates in New Delhi, Wash-
ington D.C., Brussels, and indeed in capitols around the world should be
informed by the triumphs and tribulations of past ADR and ODR efforts
to ensure that justice is not sacrificed in the name of efficiency.
& John G. Tisdell, Institutions, Motivations and Public Goods: An Experimental Test of Moti-
vational Crowding, 68 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 273 (2008)) (finding “externally imposed
regulation that would theoretically lead to higher joint returns ‘crowded out’ voluntary be-
havior to cooperate.”).
256. See Shackelford & Raymond, supra note 240, for further discussion of these princi-
ples and their applicability to designing ethical ODR systems.
